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INTRODUCTION
S URPRISE! Prosecutors investigate. This is, of course, not really
news. Public prosecutors in this country have increasingly become
involved in the investigative stages of criminal matters during the 20th
century. But the extraordinarily public and microscopic focus
directed to the investigation conducted by Independent Counsel
("IC") Kenneth Starr into the affairs (pun acknowledged) of a sitting
president from 1994 through 1999 has brought the realities of the
modern prosecutor's investigative role to the attention of the general
public.
Similarly, while courts and scholars have recognized the emerging
investigative role of prosecutors for some time,4 if you read only the
1. Robert L. Jackson, Travel Office Inquiry is Expanded; Starr Takes Over, Will
Investigate Role of First Lady, Houston Chron., Mar. 23, 1996, at A15.
2. William Douglas, Starr Subpoenas Two Arkansas PI's/Investigate Possible
Smear Campaign, Newsday (New York), Feb. 28, 1998, at A4.
3. CBS News Transcripts, The Osgood File, June 14, 1999, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Transcripts File.
4. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976) (noting that prosecutors
sometimes act in an investigative role); see also Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 487-96
(1991) (addressing the immunity contours of this role). In a 1965 predecessor case to
Burns, the Ninth Circuit noted that the prosecuting attorney may have numerous
roles, including acts which are ordinarily related to police activity. See Robichaud v.
Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 537 (9th Cir. 1965). In his famous 1940 speech "The Federal
Prosecutor," then-Attorney General Robert Jackson noted that one component of
the prosecutor's powerful role in our society is that "[hie can have citizens
investigated." 31 J. Amer. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 3 (1940). Professor John
Langbein also noted in his well-known 1973 essay that "[t]he public prosecutor in
Anglo-American criminal procedure performs two primary functions. One is
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standard promulgations of ethical rules for lawyers, you would think it
was news too. Other than providing a few obvious standards that are
almost certainly already required by other sources,5 the ABA's 1969
Model Code,6 1983 Model Rules,7 and even the more specific ABA
Criminal Justice Standards ("Standards") for prosecutors, last revised
in 1992,8 say virtually nothing specific to guide the ethics of the
investigating prosecutor.
This Article is designed to provoke examination of that lacuna. Is
there a need for ethical rules in the investigative stage? If so, what
form should they take? Specific, prohibitory? General, exhortative?
What effect, if any, would such rules have? A word of caution up
front: while this Article proposes specific language for such a rule at
which critics may shoot, it does not purport to analyze, or even to
identify, every aspect or consequence of such a rule. Nor does the
author necessarily endorse the rule.10 The Article is designed to begin
debate and analysis, not to end it. It may well be that no general rule
can capture the specific nuances between "good" and "bad"
investigative decisions with sufficient clarity to be of any positive use.
Or perhaps the negative consequences-for example, chilling effective
criminal law enforcement and exposing prosecutors to distracting
"sideshow" ethical charges and litigation; or conversely, providing an
ethical "cover" for investigating prosecutors of little practical effect-
outweigh even possible benefits. Or perhaps there is not even a
problem worth "fixing" with rules.
Still, the Starr investigation, its critics, and its defenders (who argue
in the vein of, "but all prosecutors do this"") demonstrate that the
investigatorial... ." John H. Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common
Law, 17 Am. J. of Legal Hist. 313,313 (1973).
5. See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 Fordham
Urb. LJ. 607, 616 (1999) ("For the most part, the standards of conduct established by
the disciplinary provisions relating to prosecutors are derived from constitutional
decisions... and, thus, would apply independently of the ethical rules."); Kenneth J.
Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L Rev. 669, 678-
80.
6. Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1980). The ABA originally
adopted the Model Code in 1969. See Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, Regulation of
Lawyers 447 (1999).
7. Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983).
8. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function and Defense
Function (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter Standards, 3d ed. (unless otherwise indicated,
references are to Prosecution Function Standards)]. The 1993 edition of the
Standards includes the most recent standards governing prosecutors and a full
Commentary. See id Introduction, at xi-xiv.
9. See infra Part IU.A; Proposed Criminal Justice Standard, infra app. (reprinting
the proposed rule).
10. Moreover, the author's own prosecutorial experience has been exclusively
federal. Different realities, resources and workload pressures that confront state
prosecutors might lead to different conclusions. A valuable critique of this Article
would come from persons with state and local experience.
11. See e.g., Arnold I. Bums, What By-the-Book Prosecutors Can Get Away With,
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debate must, at least, be had. Providing a specific stimulus is all that
this Article seeks to accomplish.
This Article responds to various scholars who call for specific
ethical guidelines for prosecutors.12 Scholars themselves tend to avoid
proposing specific language,13 perhaps because important theoretical
work needs to be done first, perhaps because the details of rule-
writing are perceived not to be for the academy, and perhaps because
specific language is always easily criticized.14 This Article, however,
proposes specific language, for a new rule of ethical standards to guide
prosecutors in exercising their discretion when deciding whether, and
how, to implement investigative techniques. In so proposing, it
necessarily also argues that the exercise of publishing written
standards that attempt to guide prosecutorial discretion ethically is
not a meaningless exercise, even if the standards are largely
Wall St. J., Mar. 23, 1998, at A23 ("Many of the so-called hardball tactics that the
media and the general public are now seeing up close for the first time.., are not
only 'by the book,' but actually reflect greater restraint than the actions of many
prosecutors around the country.").
12. See Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to
Include the Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. Rev. 923, 966
(1996); David A. Sklansky, Starr, Singleton, and the Prosecutor's Role, 26 Fordham
Urb. L.J. 509, 511, 538 (1999); see also Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical
Roles, 65 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 169, 209 (1997) [hereinafter Zacharias, Ethical Roles]
(advocating that "particular proposals to redefine lawyers' roles and conduct [be] put
on the table"); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial
Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 45, 48 (1991) [hereinafter
Zacharias, Do Justice] ("This vagueness [of existing ethical codes] also undermines
professional discipline of prosecutorial misconduct."); cf. David Aaron, Note, Ethics,
Law Enforcement, and Fair Dealing: A Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Nonevidentiary
Information, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 3005, 3027 (1999) (advocating "specific ethical
guidance" for prosecutors in the plea bargaining context). Professor Laurie
Levenson, while recognizing the investigative role as one of a prosecutor's undefined
responsibilities, might be read to suggest that more rules are not needed (or, in
contrast, while helpful, will never be sufficient). See Laurie L. Levenson, Working
Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26 Fordham
Urb. L.J. 553, 569-70 (1999). While one might well agree with the latter reading, the
alternative suggestion-that greater rule specificity is undesirable-is obviously at
odds with this Article.
13. See, e.g., Green, supra note 5, at 611-12 ("Rather than focusing on any
particular area of conduct, this Article examines the overarching concept.");
Zacharias, Do Justice, supra note 12, at 50, 114 (stating that the Article "highlights a
need for precise ethical directives" and provides "a blueprint for writing specific
provisions"). This point is made not to criticize Professors Green and Zacharias, both
of whom are theoretical leaders in our shared field, but merely to point out that
specific language proposals are not often found in law reviews.
14. This point comes from experience. The author recently served a term on the
ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, which is
charged inter alia with proposing language changes to the Model Rules. No specific
proposal made by any member of the Committee survived long in its initial form, and
even after thorough working-over by the Committee, no specific proposal ever
avoided further critique and amendment before it was adopted, if ever. It should be
noted, however, that such editing and reediting almost always improved the content
of the final language.
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aspirational and contextual, rather than prohibitory, in form.
In brief, this Article proposes that the ABA adopt a specific ethical
standard that directs prosecutors to invoke a conscious analysis of
proportionality when deciding whether to issue a grand jury
subpoena, seek a search warrant,'5 or take any other investigative
step.16  Certain investigative steps are, of course, routine and
necessary in virtually every case-interviewing percipient witnesses to
a crime, for example, or searching the residence of a drug dealer-so
that specific proportionate balancing is normally unnecessary or
entirely implicit. In a sense, for routine matters and techniques, the
proportionality analysis should be considered already to have been
performed-but not to have been dispensed with. The proposal
would therefore not require prospective proportionality review for
routine investigative steps in routine cases.
When considering investigative steps in any large, complicated, or
high-profile matter, however, or when considering unusual
investigative steps in any matter, prosecutors should consciously
consider the costs of the technique prospectively. Prosecutors'
analyses should account for the costs not only to the government, but
also to the targets and other affected third parties. Prosecutors should
consider not just monetary costs, but also significant intangible costs
such as privacy intrusions, emotional stress, and stigma. They should
balance such costs against factors such as the gravity of the offense,
the likely benefit from the proposed investigative step, and whether
any less costly (including less intrusive) steps might suffice.
The proposed rule is primarily contextual rather than categorical, in
the sense advocated most clearly by Professor William Simon." The
rule would not direct a particular result in specific categories of cases,
but rather would simply mandate that contextual analysis of fairness
and proportionality be undertaken. Finally, prosecutors would be
15. Of course, it is the grand jury that technically issues subpoenas, and judges
who actually issue search warrants, and it is often an investigative agent, rather than a
prosecutor, who first proposes such steps. But even the uncynical must admit that in
the modem world of law enforcement, it is often the prosecutor's decision or advice
to seek such investigative tools that is the primary "causal" step in the chain, since in
many instances a search warrant or grand jury subpoena cannot be obtained without a
prosecutor's approval. See, eg., In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Subpoena Duces Tecum,
829 F.2d 1291, 1296-97 (4th Cir. 1987) ("[Grand jury subpoenas] are issued pro forma
with no prior court approval. As such they are instrumentalities of the United States
Attorney's office although issued under the district court's name and for the grandjury.").
16. To skip directly to the proposal, turn to this Article's appendix.
17. See William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice 9, 138-69 (1998). Professor
Simon advocates the "Contextual View," of which the "basic maxim is that the lawyer
should take such actions as, considering the relevant circumstances of the particular
case, seem likely to promote justice." Id. at 9. This is counterpoised to what Simon
styles the "Dominant and Public Interest views," which prefer "rigid rule[s]" that
"dictate[ ] a particular response in the presence of a small number of factors." Id.
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directed not to implement any investigative step that would
reasonably be perceived as grossly disproportionate after group
consideration. 8
For any such investigative rule to be effective, prosecutorial duties
of supervision, reporting, and training are also essential. These
concepts encompass not only a prosecutorial duty to provide
supervision, but also to seek supervision.19 Reporting of discretionary
investigative decisions and training on the ethical exercise of
discretion should also be required for all prosecutors. These
additional duties (to seek supervision, to report, and to provide ethics
training) should be expressly placed on prosecutors not only in the
investigative stage, but generally.
I. THE PROSECUTOR'S INVESTIGATIVE ROLE TODAY
Although it may well be a 20th-century development, much of the
modem-day prosecutor's time is spent making investigative decisions.
The prosecution of complicated matters such as organized crime,
public corruption, or business fraud, often requires investigative
strategy and action before any criminal charges are filed. Prosecutors
today are centrally involved in such proactive criminal investigations. 0
Even in reactive prosecutive settings, where the crime is identified and
the perpetrator is in custody, prosecutors often have to take further
investigative steps to ready the case for amended charging or for trial.
While prosecutors may not play an investigative role in all or even
most criminal cases (the majority of which are probably reactive as
well as routine21), the importance of the investigative role lies not in
18. There is a danger of a chilling effect that "sideshow" litigation-state bar
disciplinary charges or § 1983 suits filed against prosecutors-could have on good-
faith prosecutors often operating under significant time and resource pressures. See
infra note 182 and accompanying text. Yet an entirely unenforceable ethical standard
is useless or worse. See infra Part III.C. Some standard of mandatory duty, one with
substance and not purely process, is therefore required. Thus, the proposed rule
provides that an "enforceable" violation would require a finding of "gross"
disproportionality, and thus (hopefully) be rare. The "grossly disproportionate"
standard is not entirely a satisfactory compromise, and I urge further thinking to
develop better language.
19. This is not an entirely novel idea, as the ABA's Model Rules do address the
ethical obligations of supervisory and subordinate lawyers. See Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rules 5.1, 5.2 (1998). But the proposal goes significantly
further: it would require prosecuting attorneys to seek out supervisory review and
approval in some circumstances, as an ethical duty necessary to fair implementation
of the prosecutorial role. See infra Part IV.A; cf. Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 5.2 (not requiring "subordinate lawyers" to seek supervisory advice).
20. Indeed, one experienced supervisory Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern
District of New York recommends more "strategic" investigative thinking by
prosecutors to combat other sorts of more "traditional" crime. See Elizabeth Glazer,
Thinking Strategically: How Federal Prosecutors Can Reduce Violent Crime, 26
Fordham Urb. L.J. 573,575 (1999).
21. See Joan E. Jacoby, The American Prosecutor: A Search For Identity 107
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the number of cases it affects, but in the significance of the role in the
matters where it arises.
The Supreme Court has noted the investigative prosecutorial role in
its immunity decisions.22 The involvement of prosecuting attorneys in
the investigative function is valuable, because intrusive investigative
decisions are not left solely to law enforcement personnel.
Prosecutors, due to their training, experience, and temperament, can
provide a healthy brake on non-lawyer enforcement personnel.
Moreover, as lawyers, prosecutors are subject to ethical regulation
and bar discipline, checks on discretion that are unavailable for
regulating non-lawyers law enforcement agents. This Article presumes
that the prosecutorial investigative role is here to stay, and that on
balance it is a "good thing. '
A. What the Starr Investigation Revealed:
The Specific and the General
The recent Independent Counsel investigation of President Clinton,
supervised by former D.C. Circuit Judge and U.S. Solicitor General
Kenneth Starr, brought to front-page public attention acts of
prosecutorial investigative discretion. A number of the IC's
investigative decisions were publicly criticized. None of the criticized
investigative techniques, however, were unprecedented. Nor do they
appear to have been illegal or unethical under current rules2 4
Three investigative acts that received criticism in the popular press
provide useful examples: (1) the decision to conduct the initial
surprise interview of Monica Lewinsky incommunicado for as long as
she would allow; (2) the decision to subpoena Ms. Lewinsky's
(1980) (excluding from discussion of the "intake process" "grand jury-originated and
prosecutor-initiated investigations" as "constituting a relatively small proportion of
the total intake"); Levenson, supra note 12, at 560.
22 See supra note 4.
23. It should be noted that in many European countries, prosecutorial authority
over criminal investigations is even more clear and direct. That is, investigators
operate directly under the full authority of prosecutors or prosecuting magistrates.
See Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea For Utilizing
Foreign Experience, 26 Buff. L. Rev. 361, 364-65 (1977); Ekaterina Panayotova
Trendafilova-Batchvarova, The New Legal Status of the Bulgarian Prosecutor's Office,
4 Ann. Survey Int'l & Comp. L. 132, 136-45 (1997); Gordon Van Kessell, Adversary
Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 Notre Dame L Rev. 403,421-22 (1992).
24. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit recently reversed the supervising District Judge's
referral of one of Star's alleged "illegal" acts-leaking of matters occurring before
the grand jury in violation of Rule 6(e). See In re Sealed Case, No. 99-3091, 1999 WL
709977, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 7, 1999). There may be other such referrals yet
unsealed as well as continuing Department of Justice investigation. The investigation
of the investigators is not yet closed.
25. It has been reported that the IC prosecutors present during that interview
discouraged Ms. Lewinsky from contacting her attorney. See Andrew Morton,
Monica's Story 177-78 (1999); Susan Schmidt, Starr Team Cleared of Blocking Call By
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mother to the grand jury to inquire about, among other subjects, her
daughter's sex life;26 and (3) the decision to issue broad grand jury
subpoenas for records to bookstores in the Washington, D.C. area in
order to prove that Ms. Lewinsky had, in fact, purchased a particular
book which she claimed to have given to the President (itself merely
one link in the effort to prove the relationship between Ms. Lewinsky
and the President).27
In light of the President's subsequent admission that he indeed had
had a relationship with Ms. Lewinsky that was not appropriate,28 as
well as his subsequent trial and acquittal by the Senate on
impeachment charges,29 these prosecutorial investigative decisions
have faded from the public consciousness.30 But at the time-it seems
longer than just over a year ago-they were criticized as excessive,31
and as the product of a prosecutorial office free of budgetary
constraints and healthy political oversight and thereby "out of
Lewinsky, Wash. Post, Dec. 5, 1998, at A16. This, it must be said, appears to have
been a violation of settled ethical norms, and is not encompassed within this Article's
assertion that the IC's criticized investigative steps were generally not uncommon and
not illegal or unethical per se. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 77.9 (1998) (stating that even in
the pre-charge investigative stage, federal attorneys may not "seek to induce [a]
person to forego representation or ... [o]therwise improperly seek to disrupt the
relationship between the represented person.., and counsel"). Part 77 of 28 C.F.R.
was substantially revised in 1999 after the passage of the "McDade Act," codified at
28 U.S.C. § 530B (Supp. 1999). Ironically, this resulted in the removal of some ethical
restrictions, such as the quoted portion of the former § 77.9.
26. See Stuart Taylor Jr., Must a Parent Testify?, Newsweek, Feb. 23, 1998, at 33,
33; Vikram David Amar & Akhil Reed Amar, Justice: 10 Things We Learned Front
Starr, L.A. Times, Oct. 24, 1999, at M1, available in LEXIS, News Library, L.A. Times
File.
27. See David Streitfeld, Lewinsky Defuses a Privacy Dispute; She Will Tell Starr
of Book Buys, Int'l Herald-Trib., June 24, 1998, at 3. A separate critique of the Starr
investigation, that the investigation of the Lewinsky affair was far afield, and
improperly so, of the IC's original "Whitewater" financial investigation, is also far
afield of the focus of this Article. See, e.g., Naftali Bendavid & Jan Crawford
Greenburg, Independent Prosecutor Treading Unexplored Legal Ground: Starr's
Expansion of His Investigation Raises New Questions, Chi. Trib., Jan. 22, 1998, at 13,
available in 1998 WL 2817106 (describing criticism of the scope of the Starr
investigation).
28. See Before Hours (CNNfn television broadcast, Aug. 18, 1998), available in
1998 WL 29689081.
29. See Richard A. Posner, An Affair of State xi (1999); Eric Schmitt, In the End,
Senate Passes No Harsh Judgment on Clinton, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1999, at A8.
30. They may well not have been irrelevant, however, in that they built up
pressure on the President to make his public admission, as proof of the relationship by
other means began to seem inevitable. A semen-stained dress subject to DNA
testing, derived from the very pressures placed upon Ms. Lewinsky and her family
that have been criticized, appears to have been the most undeniable item of evidence.
See Matthew Cooper & Evan Thomas, Extracting a Confession, Newsweek, Aug. 31,
1998, at 30 (describing how Starr's subpoena and the semen-stained dress "cornered"
the President).
31. See Democrats, Some Republicans, Criticize Starr's Reach, Chi. Trib., Mar. 2,
1998, at 6. The bookstore subpoena was described as "gross prosecutorial
overreaching" by an ACLU Attorney, see Streitfeld, supra note 27, at 3.
[Vol. 68730
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control."32 The Independent Counsel statute has now been permitted
to expire (as of June 30, 1999), 33 and for the foreseeable future
investigations of the President will be conducted by a Justice
Department that must choose among myriad budgetary pressures and
suffer the oversight of a presidentially-appointed Attorney General
("AG").3m All to the better, in the view of many.35
But the specific criticism of Kenneth Starr's investigative
decisions,36 now largely forgotten in the far larger wake of
congressional impeachment and trial, leaves behind lingering general
questions: are there any ethical constraints (as opposed to
constitutional limits) on the prosecutor's exercise of discretion in the
investigative stage? Should there be? If so, how should they be
formulated? Can any enforceable precision be achieved in this
discretionary and necessarily secret arena? How does one give
meaningful content to the idea that a prosecutor's exercise of
investigative discretion should be ethically bounded?
A central point that must be noted about these three criticized
investigative decisions made by the Starr IC team is that they were not
unprecedented. 37 The bookstore subpoenas were upheld by the
32. See id.; Dan Balz, Focus Shiftsfroin Lewinsky to Starr's Aim, Wash. Post, Mar.
1, 1998, at Al. See generally Deborah L Rhode, Conflicts of Commitment: Legal
Ethics in Political Context, 52 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming Jan. 2000) (manuscript at 66,
on file with author) (stating that the IC's "conduct raised a host of ethical concerns").
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1994); Independent Counsel Law Erpires Today, L.A.
Times, June 30, 1999, at A14, available in 1999 WL 2173013.
34. Of course, the IC was also subject to AG oversight, in that the statute
permitted the AG to dismiss the IC for good cause. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1994);
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988); cf id. at 707 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(praising "the 'good cause' limitation as 'protecting the independent counsel's ability
to act independently of the President's direct control,' since it permits removal only
for 'misconduct'). Moreover, there is always Congressional oversight, over both the
IC and the AG. See 28 U.S.C. § 595(a)(1) (1994); Olson, 487 U.S. at 664. The
Independent Counsel was thus not, in fact, entirely independent. But cf John P.
McKenzie, Reno's Dependent Counsel, The Nation, June 28, 1999, at 6, 6 (criticizing
proposed Department of Justice regulations that would permit the AG to dismiss
future special counsels "at will").
35. But not all. See, e.g., Keep It, But FiU It, Raleigh News & Observer, Mar. 1,
1999, at A10 (suggesting changes to the Independent Counsel statute and opposing its
elimination); Martin T. Meehan, Don't Kill the Independent Counsel Law-Fi It,
Boston Globe, Feb. 27,1999, at A19 (same).
36. The decisions were, of course, not all Starr's personally. With no actual
prosecutorial experience, Judge Starr understandably hired experienced prosecutors
to advise him. See Mary McGrory, Here's Dirt in Your Eye, Mr. Starr, Wash. Post,
June 29, 1997, at C1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wash. Post File. Some
observers have charged that the aggressive nature of these prosecutors in particular
helps explain the aggressive conduct of the Starr investigation. See, e.g., Amar &
Amar, supra note 26, at M1 (noting the "zeal and partisanship" of the Starr team
prosecutors).
37. See Burns, supra note 11, at A23; see also Jay Croft, Local Lawyers Know
Starr's Challenges, AUl.-J. Coust., Aug. 30, 1998, at A10 ("'Prosecutors do that every
single day.... [T]he law is a little bit different than people think it is."' (quoting
interview with Craig Gillen, former Assistant U.S. Attorney)).
1999]
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district judge supervising the Starr grand jury. 8  Surprise
interrogations of central witnesses combined with pressure to
cooperate, and grand jury subpoenas to innocent third party record
holders and close relatives are, in fact, not uncommon in high pressure
criminal investigations such as organized crime, significant violent
crimes (imagine the World Trade Center or Oklahoma Federal
Building bombings), public corruption cases, and large-scale drug
conspiracies.39 Any former federal prosecutor with a reasonable
amount of experience and a degree of candor can report at least one
such similar "hardball" anecdote.40 Indeed, it has been reported that a
decade earlier a different IC investigating a different Administration
subpoenaed Oliver North's wife as well as his minister to testify, and
obtained the veterinary records for North's dog; and that different
federal prosecutors subpoenaed book receipts of the religious fanatic
David Koresh when investigating the Waco, Texas mass killings. 41
38. See Books Could Point to Crime, Judge Rules, Minnesota Star-Trib., June 5,
1998, at 10A.
39. See, e.g., Kathleen Kenna, Starr Chamber: Success Dims Starr's Hopes,
Toronto Star, Aug. 1, 1998, at B1 ("Such tactics are common in other criminal cases-
such as suspected drug trafficking-and non-partisan legal experts say Starr's arsenal
of investigative techniques is no different than that used by federal prosecutors
tracking ordinary Americans."); Taylor, supra note 26, at 33 ("'I thought it was
extraordinary ... because it's not an organized-crime case, it's not a drug case.'
(quoting interview with Professor Steven A. Saltzburg, George Washington Law
School)).
Professors Vikram and Akhil Amar contend, however, that "[h]ardball tactics
appropriate when pursuing violent criminals seem outrageous when pursuing the
head of the federal executive branch." Amar & Amar, supra note 26, at M1. This
contention implicitly rests upon some conception of proportionality, as proposed in
this Article.
40. Some prosecutors thus privately reverse the classic Berger aphorism, to
provide that "[w]hile prosecutors must strike fair blows, they may also strike hard
ones." See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("[W]hile he may strike
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones."). You will have to ask other
former prosecutors for their honest and non-specific (due to grand jury secrecy
constraints as well as simple prudence) recollections. In conversation with other
prosecutors, I find such anecdotes to be common. For example, I can remember
bringing a hoped-for witness to tears when it was suggested that the witness's father
might be prosecuted-entirely and undisputedly legitimately-and receive jail time
absent the witness's cooperation. Both men had been subpoenaed to the grand jury.
This was not a proud moment for me, and frankly it was driven somewhat
unexpectedly by an experienced and hard-nosed law enforcement agent working with
a relatively inexperienced prosecutor. Yet the threat of prosecution was entirely
legitimate and sincere, and the result-bringing about a successful prosecution of the
main organized crime target of the investigation-was viewed not only as legitimate
but entirely just. Was the means proportionate to the goal? It is arguable, and thus
not violative of any concrete ethical standard I have been able to formulate. But I do
not recall performing any prospective proportionality analysis of the technique at the
time.
41. See Kenna, supra note 39, at B1. I must note that lawyers formally involved in
IC Walsh's investigation of North have told me that they do not recall North's
minister being subpoenaed and do not believe that it happened. His wife apparently
was subpoenaed. The grand jury record itself is, of course, secret.
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The issue, therefore, regarding the investigative decisions made in
the Starr investigation, is not whether the tactics were either legal or
novel. Rather, the question was, and is, purely one of prosecutorial
discretion: were the tactical decisions that were made fair and
justified? This Article recasts this question as an inquiry into whether
they were proportionate to the crime(s) under investigation. 2
How does one go about answering this question? Analysis is
necessarily imprecise and, consequently, debatable. Short of
substantively banning specific investigative techniques-an
undesirable tack if one wishes to preserve the full arsenal of lavful
techniques for use in the really important cases-the best that an
ethical rule can accomplish is: (1) cause prosecutors to at least pause
and prospectively consciously consider effects on third parties and the
proportionality of their actions; and (2) suggest some concrete factors
that ought to enter into the prosecutors' analyses of investigative
proportionality.4 3
If an ethical duty to seek supervision is also imposed, it can produce
the further benefit of subjecting the proportionality analysis to
consideration by a group, some of whom may have more experience
and less stake in the particular matter under investigation. The day of
the solo cowboy prosecutor should firmly be declared at an end.
Imposing a prosecutorial duty of seeking, and providing, supervisory
review of significant decisions
should help avoid the occasional warped judgment of the single
isolated prosecutor.
B. The Twentieth-Century Emergence of the
Prosecutor's Investigative Role
The term "investigative role" is used here to include not only when
a prosecutor directs law enforcement agents to take certain
investigative steps (such as subpoenas, search warrants, and witness
interviews), but also when agents seek prosecutorial advice about, or
approval for, implementing investigative steps that the agents are
independently considering.
Such an investigative role for prosecutors is a relatively recent
development, arising prominently only in the mid to late 20th century.
One reason for this is that the position of public prosecutor is itself a
relatively recent and uniquely American phenomenon, dating back no
more than three centuries and not gaining complete acceptance in this
42. See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: Sense of Proportion, N.Y. Tunes,
Apr. 20,1998, at A19 ("Mr. Starr ... has lost his sense of proportion.").
43. Cf. Simon, supra note 17, at 10 (noting that we "are so accustomed to
associating contextual judgement with judges and prosecutors and other government
lawyers").
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country until the early 19th century."
Meanwhile, the concept of public law enforcement investigators in
the form of police departments did not emerge until 1829 in London
and even later in American jurisdictions.45 Moreover, for the periods
between the criminal act, arrest, and trial, the criminal justice process
in this era was unencumbered by legal procedures.4 6 There was little
need for police to seek legal advice or supervision, as there were few
legal restraints on what the police could do. Nor were there many
particularly intrusive or sophisticated investigative tools available,
other than physical searches. Thus the norm through the 19th century
was that the police investigated and arrested, and sometimes even
initially advocated their cases in court. At most they turned their
cases over to prosecutors only when it was time to go to trial.47 As a
series of reports edited by Roscoe Pound and Felix Frankfurter noted
in 1922, "[i]n general, the prosecuting attorney... take[s] no part in
the investigation of the crime or the molding of the proof."48 Similarly
in 1948, Professor Louis Schwartz described the federal prosecutor's
role primarily as "deci[ding] whether and in what manner to
prosecute," while other agencies "investigate and refer cases. '49
The 20th century has seen dramatic changes in this picture, during
(at least) two significant eras. First, in the 1920s and 1930s,
Prohibition and the advent of speedy motor and air transportation
and a reliable interstate telephone system gave rise to organized
44. There is a wealth of literature on the topic, all produced only in the past 26
years. See, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 21, at 4-19 (discussing the development of public
prosecution in the United States); Jack M. Kress, Progress and Prosecution, 423
Annals of the Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 99, 108-09 (1976) (comparing the
development of American and European prosecutors); Langbein, supra note 4, at 313
(describing the public prosecutor as a "historical latecomer"); William F. McDonald,
The Prosecutor's Domain, in The Prosecutor 15, 20-24 (William F. McDonald ed.,
1979) (discussing the historical evolution of prosecutors' domain).
45. See McDonald, supra note 44, at 22. Langbein notes in passing that justices of
the peace acted in an investigatorial role in late 16th century England. See Langbein,
supra note 4, at 330. But this was a judicial inquiry; regarding a concept of
investigating prosecutors, "[t]here is no evidence that the English gave it any
thought." Id. at 335. As Jacoby explains, it was not until 1879 in the Public
Prosecutions Act that the British adopted the concept of public prosecutors, which
had earlier developed uniquely in America from various colonial influences including
the French and Dutch. See Jacoby, supra note 21, at 4-11.
46. See McDonald, supra note 44, at 22.
47. As McDonald notes, at the turn of this century "[t]he early stages of the
criminal justice process were dominated by the police[,]" not lawyers. Id. at 27.
48. Criminal Justice In Cleveland 169 (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds.,
1922). The times they were a changin', however (or maybe Cleveland was simply
atypical), and eight years later Pound wrote that "the prosecutor may or may not take
a hand in criminal investigation .... His duties in this respect are not clearly defined
and the responsibilities as between ... police and prosecutor [are], as usual, divided
or diffused." Roscoe Pound, Criminal Justice in America 185 (1930).
49. Louis B. Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion,
13 Law & Contemp. Probs. 64, 84 (1948) (quoting Exec. Order No. 6166, 1933)).
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criminal gangs spanning jurisdictional lines.-' In response, in the
1930s, the Federal Bureau of Investigation developed into a group of
especially well-trained investigators who could operate nationally
without regard to state jurisdictional restrictions. Significantly, the
FBI was placed within the Department of Justice, rather than as an
independent agency, and thus was immediately subject to supervision,
at least in theory, by a lawyer, the Attorney General.5
Yet even in the 1950s, prosecutors were far from intimately
involved in the investigative stage. The 1954 film Dragnet provides a
dramatic portrait of the uninvolved prosecuting attorney, receiving
and reviewing evidence only as developed by the non-lawyer
investigating officers. 52
In the 1950s and 1960s, however, the American public became
aware of, and concerned about, secret law enforcement investigative
techniques. Unsupervised tapping of telephones and incognito
interrogations became the subject of legislation and judicial attention,
and McCarthyism in the 1950s as well as investigation of the mafia
and anti-war groups during the 1960s led to court-imposed standards
in the investigative process.5 3 In 1968, Congress placed prosecutors
squarely in the investigative arena by requiring their review and
approval before investigative wiretaps could be implemented.
Prosecutors also came to dominate the plea negotiation process,
which increasingly dominated the disposition of criminal cases, and
investigating agents learned they had to satisfy the prosecutor in order
50. See Pound, supra note 48, at 18 (lamenting "the new tasks thrown upon
criminal law by the invention and development of the motor vehicle").
51. See 28 U.S.C. § 531 (1994). Originally Exec. Order No. 6166 (June 10, 1933),
the statute provides that "[t]he Federal Bureau of Investigation is in the Department
of Justice." Whether the FBI Director and his agents have been, in fact, well-
supervised by the AG is the topic for a different debate. The long tenure of J. Edgar
Hoover (as well as some of his tactics, such as keeping files on friends) as opposed to
the relatively short tenure of various AGs helped create an aura of independence for
the FBI vis-a-vis the Attorney General. See generally Richard Gid Powers, Secrecy
and Power. The Life of J. Edgar Hoover (1988).
52. See Dragnet (Universal Studios 1954). The focus of the film's creators on the
Los Angeles Police Department rather than the District Attorney's office may have
tilted their perspective. However, the film purports to show the reality of crime
investigation at the time and there is no reason to think its characterizations were
grossly inaccurate. Excerpts of the film are worth showing in any criminal procedure
or federal criminal law class today, especially for contrast with the post-Warren-Court
era.
53. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (subjecting
surreptitious wiretaps to Fourth Amendment scrutiny); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293, 302 (1967) (subjecting investigative identification procedures to due process
limitations); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473 (1965) (regulating custodial
interrogations); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 456 (1957) (requiring that
arrests be supported promptly by probable cause).
54. See Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2520 (1994).
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to successfully file the case.5 Finally, in 1971, the Supreme Court
ruled that investigative agents could be sued for using excessive
investigative measures. 6
Thus by the 1970s, prosecutors were intimately involved in many
criminal investigations (at least the non-routine ones) as a matter of
legislative directive or simple expediency and self-protection for law
enforcement agents. The prosecutor's advice was needed to forestall
later attacks on filed criminal cases, as well as on the investigating
agents themselves. 7
Yet even in Professor McDonald's comprehensive 1979 survey of
prosecutorial roles, the investigative function of prosecutors is seldom
mentioned and not at all central. 8 The Supreme Court did not find it
necessary to settle the scope of immunity for prosecutors acting as
investigators until 1990.19  While references to the reality of
prosecutors acting as investigators can be found in older sources,60
broad acceptance of the prosecutor's investigative role may easily be
perceived as a phenomenon of only the past two or three decades.
Even today, as Professor Daniel Richman has noted, investigative
agencies have "a considerable degree of independence" from
prosecutors: "the relationship between federal investigative agencies
and federal prosecutors is coordinate, not hierarchical."'61
Nevertheless, the concept that prosecutors do and should play some
55. See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66
Fordham L. Rev. 2117, 2120 (1998) (describing the growth of plea negotiation as the
most common method of plea disposition); McDonald, supra note 44, at 28-31. In
1931 the Wickersham Commission (formally known as the National Commission on
Law Observance and Enforcement), tasked with evaluating the effects of Prohibition,
criticized independent law enforcement investigation, noting "the slipshod way in
which cases are initiated by the police or other investigating agencies." Id. at 33. Yet
the Commission declined to recommend that prosecutors be placed in charge of the
plea-bargaining process. See id. at 34. Practice, however, quickly outpaced this official
reluctance, and by 1971 the ABA's Criminal Justice Standards made it clear that the
authority to commence criminal proceedings should be vested in the prosecutor's
office. See ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and Defense
Function, Prosecution Function Standard 3.4 (1971) [hereinafter 1971 Standards
(references are to Prosecution Function Standards unless otherwise indicated)].
56. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,389 (1971).
57. See McDonald, supra note 44, at 41-42; see also John S. Edwards, Professional
Responsibilities of the Federal Prosecutor, 17 U. Rich. L. Rev. 511, 517 (1983) ("The
federal interest in investigating and prosecuting crime has grown considerably as a
result of [various forces] over the last fifty years.").
58. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 44, at 41 (discussing conflicts over domain
between police and prosecutors yet focussing on the prosecutor's screening function
and not even mentioning prosecutorial involvement in investigative decisions).
59. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492-96 (1991) (holding that prosecutors
receive qualified good-faith, though not absolute, immunity for their investigative
actions).
60. See supra notes 4, 48 and accompanying text.
61. Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and
Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 757,780 (1999).
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role, and often a critical one, in investigative decisionmaking now
seems to be embedded and well-accepted. A 1983 article addressing
the professional responsibilities of federal prosecutors
straightforwardly included a section on Investigations.' The public
and members of Congress appeared to be quite willing to hold
Kenneth Starr responsible for the fairness of investigative steps taken
in the Clinton-Lewinsky investigation. It is time that our published
ethical authorities determine whether, and if so how, they should
expressly address this significant and now-accepted prosecutorial role.
C. Investigative Techniques Used with Prosecutorial
Involvement Today
Not all criminal investigative techniques require, or even involve,
prosecutors. Law enforcement agents may and often do, for example,
interview witnesses, obtain public records, and conduct covert
surveillance, without ever consulting a prosecutor.
The most significant investigative techniques available today,
however, generally involve or require a prosecutorial role. To what
techniques would an ethical rule governing prosecutors' discretionary
decision to invoke "investigative measures" refer? A brief catalogue
may prove helpful.
Prosecutors have grand jury subpoenas for testimony and for
documents or other physical items at their disposal.3 They may seek
search warrants and various forms of electronic surveillance orders.rP
They may authorize and oversee secretive undercover investigations.5
They may order physical surveillance of targets or witnesses. They
may send agents to interview witnesses overtly, at the witness's home
or business. They may direct persons to provide fingerprints, voice
exemplars, or other non-testimonial items of physical evidence.6
Finally, they may plea bargain with criminal actors, offering leniency
or even immunity, in return for undercover assistance against other
criminal targets and testimony later if requested.'
62. See Edwards, supra note 57, at 514-21. Notably, however, while positing that a
prosecutor has an ethical responsibility to "investigate his case thoroughly," Edwards
did not address at all the discretionary decision to implement investigative steps. See
id. at 519.
63. See Fed. R Crim. P. 6; supra note 15.
64. See, eg., 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1994) (governing the use of wiretaps).
65. See Benett L Gershman, Prosecutorial Misconduct § 1.1, at 1-3 (1998) (noting
cases in which "prosecutors participated directly and actively in the criminal
investigation").
66. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S 757,764-65 (1965).
67. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6004 (federal immunity statute).
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II. WHAT THE ETHICAL CODES Do AND Do NOT SAY ABOUT THE
PROSECUTOR'S INVESTIGATIVE ROLE
Despite the significant investigative role that prosecutors often play
in a criminal case, and the opportunity for ethical regulation that it
provides, there is remarkably little reference to the prosecutor's
investigative function in ethical codes.' Yet prosecutors can exercise
significant and broad discretion in the period between suspecting a
criminal offense or offender and deciding to charge. When then-
Attorney General Robert Jackson explained to his assembled U.S.
Attorneys almost 60 years ago that "[t]he prosecutor has more control
over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America,"
his talk focused almost entirely on investigative discretion.69 Noted
Jackson, "[h]is discretion is tremendous. He can have citizens
investigated .... "7 0 Federal prosecutors in particular, bound as they
are to the constitutional grand jury process,71 often may make
investigative decisions that can dramatically affect both the course of
the investigation and the lives of third parties, including the lives of
mere witnesses as well as those suspected of committing crime. For
example, grand jury subpoenas are governed by strict and in some
cases unique rules,7' and can cause significant disruption to businesses
and individuals. Failure to comply with them can lead to criminal
sanctions for perjury and obstruction of justice. Despite such
significant effects and consequences, the prosecutorial investigative
stage is little addressed by current ethical authorities.
A. Current Ethical Authorities
Of course, ethical rules of general application apply to prosecutors
as a subset of all lawyers.73 Thus standard ethical rules that address
68. See Flowers, supra note 12, at 974; Green, supra note 5, at 616-23; Levenson,
supra note 12, at 556; see also Lesley E. Williams, Note, The Civil Regulation of
Prosecutors, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 3441, 3464 (1999) ("Prosecutor-specific rules cover
only a fraction of prosecutorial actions.").
69. Jackson, supra note 4, at 3.
70. Id. Any gender bias this statement might suggest may be explained by its
descriptively accurate use in the overwhelmingly male-dominated prosecutorial world
of that time.
71. See U.S. Const. amend. V (providing that for any "infamous" federal crime,
the charge must be made by a Grand Jury, not the prosecutor alone). This is one of
the few provisions in the Bill of Rights that has not been "incorporated" against the
States. See Stephen A. Saltzburg & Daniel J. Capra, American Criminal Procedure
695 (5th ed. 1996).
72. For example, while Model Rule 4.2 generally prohibits lawyers from
communicating directly with persons they know to be represented by counsel, see
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.2 (1998), grand jury rules protect the
time-honored practice of allowing prosecutors to interrogate represented witnesses in
the grand jury without their attorneys in the room. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6; United
States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 579-81 (1976).
73. See Rory K. Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of federal Prosecutors?, 65
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general topics such as confidentiality, diligence, and candor govern the
prosecutor's practice (contextually applied, of course).74  It is
important to note that those generally stated ethical rules appear to
apply, by lack of express limitation, to the investigative stage as well
as during litigation. Thus prosecutors in their investigative role may
be limited, sometimes severely, by the general ethical rules.
In addition, while various sources provide slightly more specific
guidance to prosecutors in their investigative role, perhaps the most
prominent is the ABA's "Prosecution Function" guidelines. 5 First
published in 1971 as part of the ABA's Standards for Criminal Justice
project7 6 the Prosecution Function standards were last amended in
19921 Standard 3-3.1 expressly addresses the "Investigative Function
of [the] Prosecutor,"' but it says virtually nothing to limit
prosecutorial investigative discretion.
1. ABA Model Rules and Code
The ABA's 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct have been
extremely influential, as approximately forty states have adopted
some form of the Model Rules. 9 As the Tenth Circuit recently noted,
"[t]he federal courts in analyzing conduct unbecoming to a member of
the bar turn invariably to the Model Rules."
Yet while rules of general application may implicitly apply to
prosecutors as a subclass of all lawyers, only one Model Rule in the
ABA's influential assemblage, Rule 3.8, addresses the "Special
Responsibilities of a Prosecutor" as a distinct category." Moreover,
Fordham L. Rev. 355, 388, 419 (1996) [hereinafter Little, Federal Prosecutors]. This
was recently made clear for federal prosecutors by the McDade Act, 28 U.S.C. § 530B
(Supp. 1999).
74. See, eg., Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.3 (requiring diligence);
id. Rule 1.6 (imposing a duty of confidentiality); id. Rule 3.3 (mandating candor
toward a tribunal). The debate regarding the proper application of Rule 4.2("Communication With Persons Represented by Counsel") to criminal prosecutors is
an example of the need for contextual application. See Little, Federal Prosecutors,
supra note 73, at 369-75.
75. See Standards, 3d ed., supra note 8, at 1-116. The Standards are also
reprinted, without their Commentary, in Gillers & Simon, supra note 6, at 527-60.
76. See 1971 Standards, supra note 55, at 17-139. The ABA's Standards for the
Administration of Criminal Justice project was initiated in 1964 by then-ABA
President Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and resulted in formal adoption of 17 sets of Standards
addressing various aspects of the criminal justice system by 1973. See Gillers & Simon,
supra note 6, at 527. The Prosecution Function and Defense Function Standards arejust two of these. An annotated compilation of the second edition of all 17 Standards
was published as a looseleaf set in 1980.
77. See Gillers & Simon, supra note 6, at 527.
78. Standards, 3d ed., supra note 8, Standard 3-3.1.
79. See Gillers & Simon, supra note 6, at 3.
80. United States v. Colorado Supreme Court, No. 98-1081, 1999 WVL 679678, at
*2 (10th Cir. Sept. 1, 1999).
81. Model Rule 3.8 provides in full that:
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although the official Comment to Rule 3.8 states broadly that "[a]
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice,"' this seven-
part rule says nothing about the investigator's role, other than to limit
the discretion to subpoena lawyers to the grand jury in subsection
(f).83  On this point, some might argue that providing lawyers with
special protection from subpoenas in an ethical rule drafted by
lawyers reflects something other than high-minded objectivity.
Regardless, Rule 3.8(f) is the only ABA Model Rule directed
specifically and independently to the investigative stage.
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not
supported by probable cause;
(b) make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised
of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been
given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;
(c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of
important pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing;
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the
defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information
known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this
responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal;
(e) exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement
personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the
prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement
that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6;
(f) not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding
to present evidence about a past or present client unless the prosecutor
reasonably believes:
(1) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any
applicable privilege;
(2) the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of
an ongoing investigation or prosecution; and
(3) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information.
(g) except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the
nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate
law enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments
that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation
of the accused.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 (1998).
82. Id. Rule 3.8 cmt. 1. See generally Green, supra note 5 (discussing the
prosecutor's duty to seek justice); Zacharias, Do Justice, supra note 12 (same).
83. See supra note 81. Subsection (f) has been the object of repeated attacks, as
impinging too greatly on prosecutorial investigative discretion. The Third Circuit has
struck it down as beyond the district court's rulemaking authority. See Baylson v.
Disciplinary Bd., 975 F.2d 102, 104 (3d Cir. 1992). But the First Circuit has upheld it,
see Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Court, 53 F.3d 1349, 1357-59 (1st Cir. 1995),
although it noted that the same issue had evenly divided the Circuit sitting en banc in
United States v. Klublock, 832 F.2d 664, 665 (1st Cir. 1987). The Tenth Circuit has
upheld the subsection if modified so as not to apply to grand jury subpoenas. See
Colorado Supreme Court, 1999 WL 679678, at *2; supra note 80 and accompanying
text; see also supra note 15 (discussing the respective investigative roles of the grand
jury and prosecutor).
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The 1969 predecessor to the Model Rules, the ABA's Model Code
of Professional Responsibility, is no different. Only one binding
Disciplinary Rule (DR 7-103) and one aspirational Ethical
Consideration (EC 7-13) in the Code are directed specifically to
prosecutors.' Although neither source addressed the affirmative
investigative role of prosecutors with any specificity, EC 7-13 did note
that "a prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence
merely because he believes it will damage the prosecutor's case or aid
the accused. ' Like the Comment to Model Rule 3.8, EC 7-13 also
generally stated that a prosecutor's duty is "to seek justice, not merely
to convict."'ss This, of course, echoed the only provision directed to
prosecutors in the ABA's first model code, the 1908 Cannons of
Professional Ethics: "The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public
prosecution is not to convict, but to see that justice is done."'
Notably, the 1969 Code contains an additional Ethical
Consideration, which is not expressly found in the later 1983 Model
Rules, that speaks more directly to the proposal of this Article. EC 7-
14 directed that "[a] government lawyer who has discretionary power
relative to litigation should refrain from instituting or continuing
litigation that is obviously unfair."ss Limited as it was to litigation, this
EC ignored the investigative stage. Yet a concept of limiting a
prosecutor's discretionary power by reference to the "obvious
unfairness" of a tactic resonates strongly with the proportionality
limitation proposed in this Article.
84. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-103 (1970) (describing
the duties of prosecutors and other government attorneys); id. EC 7-13. EC 7-14 also
addressed the government lawyer generally, although not prosecutors specifically. See
id. EC 7-14. The Preamble to the 1970 Code explained that the Disciplinary Rules
were mandatory while the Ethical Considerations were aspirational in character. See
id. Preamble.
85. Id. EC 7-13 (emphasis added). Drafted soon after the Supreme Court's
exhortation to timely disclose exculpatory evidence, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963), it seems clear that the purpose of EC 7-13 was not to limit prosecutorial
discretion in the affirmative pursuit of evidence, but rather to ensure that
investigating prosecutors do not "sandbag" when they think the evidence will help
rather than incriminate their target. Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972)
("A grand jury investigation 'is not fully carried out until every available clue has
been run down and all witnesses examined in every proper way'...." (quoting
United States v. Stone, 429 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1970)); Edwards, supra note 57, at
519 ("[A] prosecutor has a professional responsibility to investigate his case
thoroughly in order to diminish the chance that an innocent person will be charged or
that a guilty one will be acquitted.").
86. Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-13.
87. ABA Canons of Professional Ethics Canon 5, para. 2 (1908).
88. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-14 (emphasis added).
The Model Rules direct prosecutors not to file charges they know are not supported
by probable cause, see Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8(a), but do not
include reference to any general standard of unfairness.
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2. The ABA's Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function
As noted above, the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice contain a
section expressly titled "Investigative Function of the Prosecutor." 9
According to the 1993 edition of the Standards, their purpose is to
provide the criminal justice community's conception of "what good,
professional practice is and should be."9 As the introduction to the
1971 Standards made clear, with the exception of some specific
practices condemned as "unprofessional" and thereby patently
disciplinable, the Standards were not intended to serve as enforceable
rules but rather as "guides to honorable practice." 91
Nevertheless, as Professors Gillers and Simon have noted, "[t]he
Standards [generally] ... have been enormously influential. More
than 40 states have revised their criminal codes on the basis of the
ABA Standards and the Standards are cited dozens of times in each
volume of federal court opinions."'  Indeed, a search of the largest
Lexis case law library reveals that the Standards have been cited over
1550 times by various federal and states courts.93 The United States
Supreme Court noted in Strickland v. Washington94 that when courts
address the performance of criminal defense attorneys, "[p]revailing
norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards
and the like.., are guides to determining what is reasonable" for
constitutional purposes.95
The "Prosecution Function" Standards alone, while yielding fewer
citations,96 are similarly influential. The opinions of lower courts
89. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
90. Standards, 3d ed., supra note 8, at xiv; accord, 1971 Standards, supra note 55,
General Introduction, at 8-10.
91. 1971 Standards, supra note 55, at 8-10.
92. Gillers & Simon, supra note 6, at 430. This despite the caution that the
Standards are not to "be used as criteria for the judicial evaluation of alleged
misconduct of the prosecutor to determine the validity of a conviction." Standards, 3d
ed., supra note 8, Standard 3-1.1. The same cautionary language was found in the
original 1971 Standards, which also provided language making the distinction between
use as a disciplinary standard versus a substantive measure of a conviction's
legitimacy. See 1971 Standards, supra note 55, Standard 1-1.1(e) ("These standards
are intended as guides for the conduct of lawyers and as the basis for disciplinary
action, not as [substantive] criteria ... ."). The ABA has always been careful to stress
the difference between its Model Rules being used for disciplinary purposes, as
opposed to being used as substantive legal clubs. See Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Scope.
93. The search terms on Lexis-Nexis were "ABA Standards For Criminal Justice."
94. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
95. Id. at 688. The Strickland Court went on to note that the Standards are "only
guides[,]" id., and that attorney performance must be examined contextually, "on the
facts of the particular case." Id. at 691. Lower courts are in accord regarding the
guiding-but-not-dispositive effect of the ABA Standards. See, e.g., Jeffries v. Blodgett,
5 F.3d 1180, 1198 (9th Cir. 1993) ("ABA Standards serve only as a 'guide' for
determining whether an attorney's performance is adequate.").
96. Restricting the same LEXIS search to cases that also mention Prosecution
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suggest that the same Strickland use is true with regard to the role that
the Prosecution Functions standards play in evaluating prosecutorial
misconduct.97 Indeed, the United States Attorney's Manual notes for
all federal prosecutors that "since lower courts utilize the standards in
determining issues... it is recommended that all United States
Attorneys familiarize themselves with them."98
The pendency of the ABA's Prosecution Function project in 1969
may explain the absence of more specific prosecutorial guidance in
the ABA's Model Code.99 But even the ABA Prosecution Function
Standard that addresses the Investigative Function provides virtually
no specific guidance regarding the use of investigative techniques. In
fact, the current edition of the Standards begins with a statement that
"[a] prosecutor ordinarily relies on police and other investigative
agencies for investigation of alleged criminal acts."'1' This may be
true for a majority of cases, and is literally true in all cases, as a
prosecutor should avoid the role of the actual investigator to preserve
the distinction between witness and advocate. 01  As suggested
above,"~ however, this initial statement ignores the influential role
that modern prosecutors often play as investigative advisors, and even
directors, with respect to many investigative steps in important or
complicated criminal matters.
More specifically, the Standard governing investigation provides
only that prosecutors should (a) fully investigate all cases; (b) not
invidiously or improperly discriminate; (c) not use or encourage
others to use illegal means to obtain evidence; (d) not interfere with
communications between witnesses and defense counsel; (e) not use
misleading documents to secure witness interviews; 103 (f) not
Function yields 193 case citations. See supra note 93.
97. See, e.g., Morgan v. Perry, 142 F.3d 670, 684 (3d Cir. 1998) (applying
Prosecutorial Function Standards to a military prosecutor); Harris v. Colorado, 888
P.2d 259, 264 (Colo. 1995) ("[G]uidelines for appropriate prosecutorial conduct are
contained in the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function ... which
have frequently been acknowledged by this court.").
98. United States Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Manual § 9-2.101 (1999),
reprinted in 3 Department of Justice Manual (2d ed., Aspen 1999) and available on
<http"//www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foiareadingroom/usam/>.
99. See 1971 Standards, supra note 55, Proposed Revisions of Standards,
Introduction, at 1 (stating that the Tentative Draft, proposed in 1970, was revised to
conform to the then-new Model Code of Professional Responsibility).
100. Standards, 3d ed., supra note 8, Standard 3-3.1(a). The commentary to this
Standard has noted, however, since 1971 that "in some circumstances the prosecutor
[should] take the initiative to investigate .... 1971 Standards, supra note 55,
Standard 3-3.1 cmt. a.
101. The need to preserve this dichotomy is recognized in the Standards for
Criminal Justice, which direct that "a prosecutor should avoid interviewing a
prospective witness except in the presence of a third person." Standards, 3d ed., supra
note 8, Standard 3-3.1(g).
102. See supra Part I.
103. This standard was in the original 1971 Standards, see 1971 Standards, supra
note 55, Standard 3-3.1(d), which makes the prosecutor's actions in United States v.
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unofficially grant immunity from prosecution; and (g) not normally' °4
interview prospective witnesses alone. 5 Note the absence of positive
drafting: all but one of the Standard's subsections is phrased in the
negative ("A prosecutor should not") rather than providing
affirmative ethical guidance. Telling prosecutors what they should not
do is certainly worthwhile. But providing them guidance regarding
what they should do in the broad discretionary areas that remain
would seem an equally worthwhile, if more difficult, project. The
ABA Standards do not, on the whole, attempt this.
3. Other Sources
Other discrete, hard-to-find sources also provide some ethical
guidance to prosecutors in their investigative role. These sources tend
to merge substantive legal standards with ethical guidance, without
express separation and in manuals directed to specific investigative
contexts. For example, in furtherance of (or perhaps to forestall
application of) Model Rule 3.8(f), the U.S. Attorney's Manual
provides guidelines to regulate the issuance of grand jury subpoenas
to criminal defense lawyers." Similarly, in 1990, the ABA issued
Guidelines for the Issuance of Search Warrants which, while
addressed largely to issuing judges, contains some provisions
applicable to prosecutors.10
In fact, the 1997 revised U.S. Attorney's Manual now has an entire
chapter entitled "Obtaining Evidence."'' 8 This chapter provides a
Hammad, 846 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), modified, 858 F.2d 834, 836 (2d Cir. 1988), affd after
remand, 902 F.2d 1062 (1990), in which the prosecutor used a phony grand jury
subpoena to induce a target to provide an interview at the prosecutor's office, more
difficult to defend. See also United States v. Thomas, 320 F. Supp. 527, 530 (D.D.C.
1970) (ordering a prosecutor to cease such a practice).
104. The Commentary to Standard 3-3.1(g) suggests that a distinction might
rationally be made between solo interviews of "friendly," as opposed to adverse,
witnesses, as well as regarding trial preparation re-interviews of witnesses whose
statements have already been memorialized by investigators. See Standards, 3d ed.,
supra note 8, Standard 3-3.1 cmt.
105. The summaries in the text correspond to the subsections of Standard 3-3.1.
Standard 3-3.1(b) was added to the Standards in 1992; the other Standards were
original to the 1971 draft, but for "stylistic changes." Standards, 3d ed., supra note 8,
Standard 3-3.1 (History of the Standard).
106. See United States Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Manual § 9-2.101 (1999),
reprinted in 3 Department of Justice Manual (2d ed., Aspen 1999) and available on
<http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foiareadingroonlusam>. The Manual's provisions
do not create enforceable legal rights for third parties, but they do provide standards
for internal disciplinary actions against federal prosecutors. See Rory K. Little, The
Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the Department of Justice's
Role, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 347, 407 n.322 (1999) [hereinafter Little, Federal Death
Penalty].
107. See generally Thomas F. Liotti, Guidelines for the Issuance of Search
Warrants-The American Bar Association Initiative, N.Y. St. B. J., Dec. 1991, at 28
(describing and discussing the ABA guidelines).
108. U.S. Attorney's Manual § 9-13.000.
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wealth of guidance for federal prosecutors. Yet it is very specific and
addresses only discrete areas that have caused problems in the past.
There is no general guidance regarding the exercise of prosecutorial
investigative discretion in the U.S. Attorney's Manual.
Various associations that address state and local prosecution offices
have also issued ethical manuals for prosecutors, which contain
various degrees of general provisions directed to the investigative
role. Most prominently, in 1977 the National District Attorneys
Association ("NDAA") issued its national prosecution standards, in
which chapter seven addresses "the investigative function.""' 9 This
chapter, consisting of four Standards, begins by advocating that
"[a]mong the many duties of prosecution, the responsibility to
investigate deserves.., prominence and focus.""'  Yet this entire
chapter is primarily a pro-prosecution advocacy piece rather than an
useful ethics code. Its first Standard advocates that "funds should be
provided" to prosecutors' offices for complete investigative
competence"'--not a bad idea, but hardly an ethical standard. The
second NDAA investigative standard advocates for strong
prosecutorial immunity."' The remaining two NDAA standards
advocate for prosecutorial involvement in, and adequate funding for,
search warrant and subpoena powers and review.113 Thus, without
exception, the 1977 NDAA standards represent arguments for
expansion of the prosecutorial role in investigation, and do not
suggest ethical limitations on such expanded discretionary authority.
There are other sources that purport to address the prosecutor's
investigative role. In 1973, a National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals published six reports, one of
which contained a section entitled "The Prosecutor's Investigative
Role."" This three-paragraph section, however, simply noted that
prosecutors should have adequate investigative resources, as well as
subpoena power and search warrant review authority."5 It suggested
no ethical standards for governance of these prosecutorial powers,
and was in effect simply a less detailed predecessor to the NDAA
standards issued four years later.
The American Trial Lawyers Association's Code of Conduct also
provides some advice for public prosecutors, including: "In exercising
109. National District Attorneys Association, national prosecution standards, ch. 7,
at 108-23 (1977). Perhaps in keeping with the ethos of the time, the lower case letters
for the title are in the original.
110. Id Standard 7.1 cmt., at 109.
111. Id Standard 7.1(A).
112. See id Standard 7.2, at 112.
113. See id Standard 7.3, at 115; id Standard 7.4, at 121.
114. See American Bar Association, Comparative Analysis of Standards and Goals
of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals with
Standards for Criminal Justice of the American Bar Association vii, 293 (1973).
115. See id. at 293.
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discretion to investigate.., a [prosecutor] shall not show favoritism
for, or invidiously discriminate against, one person among others
similarly situated. ' 116 Again, this advice, while certainly appropriate,
is general and likely already required by constitutional and other
rules.117 Likewise, because it is not contained in the ABA's Model
provisions, which have been adopted by most states in the Union,"
8
the advice is not currently in most enforceable ethical codes. n 9
There are many other sources purporting to address the
prosecutor's investigative role.2 0 None that I have found, however,
attempt to provide any positive guidance for the fair, ethical limitation
of the prosecutor's discretionary power to investigate. This uniform
absence might suggest uniform agreement that no ethical guidance is
necessary or useful in this area. I speculate briefly below about other
possible explanations for the absence. In any case, the fact is that no
matter how poorly drafted the reader may find this Article's proposal,
it has the advantage of competing in a heretofore open field.
B. Why Don't Current Authorities Address the Investigative Stage,
and Why Should They?
As explained above, the American prosecutor's investigative role is
a relatively recent phenomenon, and not the primary focus of ethical
116. American Trial Lawyer's Association, Code of Conduct (1988), ch. 9
(Responsibilities of Government Lawyers), sec. 9.2, reprinted in Gillers & Simon,
supra note 6, at 265-66. This is predictive, of course, of Standard 3-3.1(b), which was
added in the 1992 edition. See Standards, 3d ed., supra note 8, Standard 3-3.1(b).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65 (1996) (holding that
while the standard for discovery may be high, invidious discrimination by prosecutors
is prohibited under the Due Process clause).
118. See Gillers & Simon, supra note 6, at 3 ("[A]bout forty jurisdictions have
adopted substantial portions of the [ABA] Model Rules."). In the 1999 edition of its
Compendium, the ABA represents that 43 states have adopted the Model Rules,
another three have adopted the predecessor 1969 Model Code, and two others are
considering adopting the Model Rules. See ABA Compendium 525-26 (1999).
119. In 1998, however, the ABA added a comment to its general "Misconduct"
Rule, Model Rule 8.4, which expressly identified race and other discrimination as
disciplinable "conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(d) (1998); see ABA Compendium, supra note
118, at 118 (noting the amendment). The extent of state adoption of this model
commentary remains to be seen.
120. See, e.g., California District Attorneys Association, Ethics and Responsibility
for the California Prosecutor § 3.1 (1992) (noting that when acting in their
investigative role, "prosecutors are governed by the same ethical considerations
applicable to other prosecutorial functions"); California District Attorneys
Association, Uniform Charging Standards Standard I.B (1974) (detailing prosecutors'
investigative responsibilities). In 1988, Professor John Jay Douglas published a
comprehensive overview entitled Ethical Issues in Prosecution (1988). In a section
entitled "Investigation and Discovery" that covers over 60 typescript pages, Professor
Douglas canvasses a great deal of current case law and ethical code authorities. See id.
at 157-219. He does not, however, offer ethical guidance beyond that extant in the
sources he cites. See id.
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attention even in 1970, for example, when the Prosecution Function
Standards were first adopted. Moreover, the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion has traditionally been considered to be
appropriately beyond all but the most forgiving judicial review,122 and
ethical authorities may share this hesitancy. The virtually
unreviewable status of prosecutorial discretion may have led ethicists
to avoid proposing concrete non-statutory restrictions. As for
development of such standards by prosecutors themselves, it is
certainly conceivable that, having previously been free of even gentle
regulation in their investigative role, they would oppose an attempt to
promulgate ethical standards that would limit this discretion while
exposing prosecutors to professional attack.
One can also speculate that the absence of express ethical guidance
addressing the exercise of prosecutorial investigative discretion may
flow from an "all's fair" attitude toward the investigative pursuit of
criminal offenders. As the Supreme Court has made clear, many
specific constitutional protections for suspected criminal offenders do
not apply until the investigative stage has ended and the defendant
has been formally charged.'2 Prior to beginning the formal
prosecutive stage, societal forces and means brought to bear on
identifying and apprehending criminal violators may be viewed as
appropriately unregulated, aside from very general constitutional
constraints. Yet others have suggested that the vacuum left in the
investigative stage ought to be filled by some contextual ethical
guidance. 124 Why do existing ethical codes not attempt this?
Perhaps a necessary preliminary question is, why should ethical
codes attempt this? If the exercise of investigative authority by
prosecutors is not viewed as a problem, attempts to "fix" it are at best
unnecessary, and, worse, impediments to justice. Indeed, many
investigative techniques (for example, search warrants and custodial
interrogations) are bounded by specific Constitutional authority,'2
and all are presumably bounded by the fundamental fairness
component of the Due Process clauses.1  For the latter half of this
121. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
122. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464.
123. See, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972) (holding that a
defendant has no right to have counsel present at an identification procedure prior to
the initiation of formal prosecutorial proceedings).
124. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 55, at 2126 ("[A] host of... investigative
decisions ... appear to be solely matters of prosecutorial prerogative."); Sklansky,
supra note 12, at 538 ("We want prosecutors to be bound by something other than
politics.... [I]f that something else is not the normal ethical rules of the legal
profession, what is it?").
125. See U.S. Const. amends. IV, V; see, eg., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,471
(1966) (discussing a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights during a custodial
interrogation).
126. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Jacobson v. United States 503 U.S. 540,
548-54 (1992) (holding that the police may not induce an individual to commit a
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century, incorporation of the Due Process Clause has operated to
provide a constitutional floor of "fundamental fairness" to restrict
particularly gross exercises of executive investigative harassment. As
the original introduction to the Standards noted in 1971, "[t]he
Constitution forbids various investigatory mechanisms which would
be highly efficient, the General Warrant being only one of these.' 27
It can plausibly be argued that beyond these constitutional
boundaries, executive discretion as to how to investigate crime should
be untrammeled, lest significant criminal offenders escape
identification, capture, or successful prosecution. This argument
might continue that, given the scrutiny afforded these days to modern
public prosecutors by media, citizens, and legislatures, and the
increasingly high hiring standards of prosecutors' offices, prosecutors
can be trusted to be fair most of the time."m The metaphor of a "war
on crime" completes this "all's fair" analogy: criminals who have
broken basic social rules deserve no extra quarter in society's
investigative response. They have forfeited any right to ethical
treatment by their highly unethical decision to make war against their
fellow citizens.
The response to the argument that specific ethical standards
addressing prosecutors in the investigative stage are unnecessary is
multi-faceted, and I do not claim it to be overwhelming. Indeed, after
a debate which this Article hopes to stimulate, policymakers might
conclude that no additional ethical standards are needed. A brief
theoretical counterargument thus suffices for present purposes.
First, one can certainly find cases in which prosecutorial decisions
regarding how to investigate are strongly criticized.2 9 In addition,
scholars as well as the popular media have vocally criticized modern
crime); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967) (applying due process analysis to
police identification procedures); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952)
(subjecting physical searches to due process analysis).
127. 1971 Standards, supra note 55, at 3.
128. An early statement of this "trust the prosecutors" argument appears in United
States v. Dottereich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943) ("[T]he good sense of prosecutors...
must be trusted."). See also Lynch, supra note 55, at 2139 (characterizing
prosecutorial discretion as "a choice made with the understanding that specialized
agencies will, subject to political control, allocate priorities in a sensible way.")
Justice Stewart, among others, criticized this view. See, e.g., Scarborough v. United
States, 431 U.S. 563, 579 n.1 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Proper construction of a
criminal statute... cannot depend upon the good will of those who must enforce it.").
129. See, e.g., Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553-54 (finding entrapment "[wihen the
Government's quest for convictions leads to the apprehension of an otherwise law-
abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would never have run afoul of the
law"); United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 243-44 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming grant of
new trial based in part on government's provision of excessive benefits to cooperating
criminals); Washington v. Lively, 921 P.2d 1035, 1048-49 (Wash. 1996) (finding
outrageous governmental misconduct in violation of a defendant's due process rights
when the government sent an informant to substance abuse group counseling
meetings to lure recovering alcoholics into committing illegal acts).
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day prosecutors as excessive and unethical in their investigative
roles.'O Some observers, at least, appear to believe that limitations on
criminal investigations are needed.
Moreover, little citational proof is necessary to support the
propositions that: (1) investigations can harm innocent third parties;
(2) even targets of good faith criminal investigations can be innocent;
and (3) an express directive to prosecutors that they should consider,
and subject to group analysis, the proportionate value of their
discretionary decisions, could have an improving (if perhaps modest)
effect on the overall fairness of criminal investigations.
Even putting aside the point that the visceral "all's fair" response
presumes the guilt of investigative targets, the argument ignores the
significant adverse effects that aggressive investigative techniques can
have on innocent third parties. For example, compliance with
subpoenas directed at record-holders carries a financial cost, and can
expose mere custodians to the sometimes unpredictable consequences
of prosecutorial focus. Searches directed at third parties can be
intrusive and disruptive."' Undercover investigations can entrap the
unwary or naive.1 2 Stigma can flow simply from being investigated or
being associated with a criminal investigation, even if no criminal case
results. Witnesses, by mere chance association with a target, can have
their privacy destroyed and their lives immutably altered. Wiretaps
monitor and record the innocent as well as the guilty. Surveillance
can turn casual lunch partners into investigative subjects. As Judge
John Gleeson has noted, "[t]he impact of these [investigative]
powers... cannot be overstated. The service of a single grand jury
subpoena can ruin a person's livelihood and, on occasion, even
jeopardize a person's life. 133 Surely the independent rights of third
parties are not forfeited by the criminal acts even of legitimate
investigative targets. One can imagine, then, a rationale for
incorporating ethical restraints on at least those investigative
techniques which are not focused directly and exclusively on a
suspected criminal actor.
Moreover, the investigative stage of a criminal case generally
precedes the decision to charge, and its very purpose is to discover
130. See, eg., Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Pitt. L Rev. 393
passim (1992) (arguing that prosecutors have become less bound by ethical
constraints); Bill Moushey, Win at All Costs (pts. 1-10), Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Nov.
22-Dec. 13, 1998, at Al (recounting incidents of prosecutorial excesses), available in
LEXIS, News Library, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette File.
131. See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 573 (1978) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the intrusions that search warrants permit into the privacy of
third parties).
132. See e.g., Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 551-54 (condemning government ploy to induce
an individual to commit a crime).
133. John Gleeson, Supervising Criminal Investigations: The Proper Scope of the
Supervisory Power of Federal Judges, 5 J.L & Pol'y 423, 425 (1997).
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persuasive evidence not yet known. By definition, the low quantum of
evidence necessary to demonstrate probable cause to charge has not
yet been assembled."M  At this early stage, the constitutional
presumption of innocence ought to operate most forcefully. It may
result that, upon investigation, the putative "target" is not charged,
thereby standing innocent in the eyes of all but the most cynical in our
constitutional system. Indeed, if the innocent can sometimes be
convicted despite the utmost precautions,135 can one hesitate to say
that the innocent may also, and perhaps more frequently, become the
targets of even good faith criminal investigation? If this proposition is
not offensive, then one can responsibly advocate some ethical fairness
restraints on investigative discretion, even as to those techniques that
affect only the targets.
Finally, prosecutors already routinely exercise their discretion to
limit investigative measures. Although the Supreme Court has stated
that "[a] grand jury investigation 'is not fully carried out until every
available clue has been run down and all witnesses examined in every
proper way,"'136 it is simply not accurate to say that prosecutors
currently use every investigative tool and take every possible step in
every case.37 Limited resources that must be spread among many
competing investigations already place a "reality check" on most
investigators' investigative discretion. In fact, the perceived absence
of such resource limitations on the IC was one of the chief criticisms
of the Starr investigation. 138 By necessity, investigative discretion is
already limited by prosecutors in most cases by a cost-benefit analysis,
conscious or otherwise. Formalizing an investigative ethical standard
that requires conscious evaluation of proportionality would therefore
not impose unprecedented limits on heretofore unlimited
investigations. In fact, while the proposal in this Article hopes to
broaden the range of interests consciously considered, in many
prosecutorial offices it would merely formalize, as an ethical matter, a
style of limiting prosecutorial analysis which is already in play.
134. It is true, of course, that some investigation can and usually does continue
after the charging decision. Such pretrial investigation is supported by a higher initial
quantum of evidence (probable cause), but the presumption of innocence still
operates.
135. See Adam Cohen, Innocent, After Proven Guilty: More Inmates are Being Set
Free Thanks to DNA Test-and a Pioneering Law Clinic, Time, Sept. 13, 1999, at 26.
136. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,701 (1972), (quoting United States v. Stone,
429 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1970)).
137. See Lynch, supra note 55, at 2136 ("Limited resources inexorably require
prosecutorial triage."); id. at 2140 (noting the impact of "the amount ... society is
willing to expend to investigate"). Rare exceptions where investigative measures
have truly been exhaustive might include the Unabomber, World Trade Center, or
Oklahoma City Federal Building mass murder cases.
138. See William Michael Treanor, Independent Counsel and Vigorous Investigation
and Prosecution, 61 L. & Contemp. Probs. 149, 149 (1998).
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III. GUIDING THE INVESTIGATING PROSECUTOR'S DISCRETION:
REQUIRING A PROPORTIONATE EVALUATION
In the recent past, the concept of "guided discretion" has been
perceived as useful for the judicial branch.139 The concept might also
be useful if applied to prosecutors. This Article proposes the concept
of proportionality as a manageable ethical precept for prosecutors to
guide their exercise of investigative discretion."4 The concept is not a
precise one, yet it is usefully applied in a number of domestic and
international legal contexts. The basic proposition is simple:
prosecutors should be directed to consciously engage in a
proportionality analysis when deciding what investigative steps to take
in any given case. In non-routine cases, such analysis should be
subjected to prospective supervisory review unless exigencies
intervene.
Yet while easy to proclaim, the proposal is immediately daunting to
implement. As the ABA itself has said about its own Prosecution and
Defense Standards, such propositions may easily become mere
"glittering generalities," full of moral pomp yet bereft of enforcement
or real-world respect.41 While wary of this critique, this Article comes
down solidly on the side of those who believe that some attempt at
ethical guidance is better than none, and that ethical rules do have
positive effects on lawyers' real-world conduct.142
Having asserted this, however, avoiding specifics might be called
the coward's way out. This Article aims to provide "realists" with
something concrete to criticize. Specific language is therefore
proposed below, intended to be added either as a new Standard to the
139. The federal sentencing guidelines are based on a concept of "guided
discretion." See Lisa M. Rebello, Note, Sentencing Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Five Years of "Guided Discretion," 26 Suffolk U. L Rev. 1031, 1037
(1992). So, too, is our current capital punishment regime. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 189 (1976). Even critics of the current sentencing guidelines system support
some theoretical structure to constrain extreme exercises of judicial discretion. See
Kate Stith & Jose Cabranes, Fear of Judging 167-68 (1998).
140. Indeed, a concept of proportionality would seem to be generally applicable in
any area in which prosecutorial discretion is permitted to operate, for example, in
charging, plea negotiation, trial tactics, and sentencing recommendations.
141. See 1971 Standards, supra note 55, General Introduction, at 6 ("It may be said
that the results are doomed either to be a series of glittering generalities or a list of
prohibitions so obvious in content as not to require statement or so restrictive as to
inhibit effective advocacy.").
142. See Simon, supra note 17, at 11, 195-96; Deborah L Rhode, Why the ABA
Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 Tex. L Rev. 689, 707
(1981); Zacharias, Do Justice, supra note 12, at 108-09; Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity
in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of
Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 Notre Dame L Rev. 223, 233-37 (1993) [hereinafter
Zacharias, Specificity]; see also Russell G. Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously: Legal
Ethics as the Most Important Subject in Law School, 29 Loy. U. Chi. LJ. 719, 726
(1998) (arguing that teaching ethics in law school will promote ethical conduct among
future lawyers).
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ABA's Prosecution Function Standards, or (better) to be
incorporated into the ABA's forthcoming new Model Rules (the goal
of the ongoing "Ethics 2000" project). 143  At this early stage,
identifying the best vehicle is less important than stimulating the
debate. The goal is to generate discussion regarding whether, and
how, to specify and improve ethical standards for prosecutors in their
investigative roles.
A. The Proposed New Ethical Rule for Investigating Prosecutors
Without further ado, let the debate begin. Here is proposed specific
language that could be added to the ABA's next set of model ethical
rules for lawyers:
Proportionality in Investigation
1. A prosecutor is not obligated to take every possible step in the
investigation of a suspected criminal offense. Rather, the prosecutor
should consciously engage in an analysis of proportionality in
choosing which investigative steps to pursue, and how aggressively
to pursue them.1
44
2. At a minimum, a proportionate investigative decision should
consider:
(a) the monetary cost of the step, not just for the prosecutor's
office, but also for any witnesses who must comply with
investigative demands;
(b) nonmonetary costs of the step, such as intrusions on privacy,
potential harm to innocent third parties, potential for violence or
destructive harm, damage to the prosecution office's own
credibility or community standing, and any unnecessary
interference with witness's ongoing lives;
(c) the potential benefits of the step, and whether those benefits
could be achieved by less intrusive or costly means.
3. These costs and considerations should be balanced against the
gravity of the offense and any exigent time constraints.
4. A prosecutor should not approve a particular investigative step or
strategy that reasonably seems grossly disproportionate after
143. See Center for Professional Responsibility, Ethics 2000-Commission on the
Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (visited Oct. 20, 1999) <http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html>.
144. It should go without saying that all investigative techniques should be invoked
initially only in good faith and to further a bona fide criminal investigation. It is the
general rule, for example, that a grand jury subpoena may not be issued "for the sole
purpose of harassment [or] intimidation." In Re Grand Jury Subpoena: Subpoena
Duces Tecum, 829 F.2d 1291, 1305 (4th Cir. 1987) (Wilkenson, J., concurring).
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evaluation, including supervisory evaluation as required below.
5. Duty to Seek Supervision. In any non-routine or high-profile
matter, or for non-routine investigative techniques, the investigating
prosecutor should seek supervisory review and approval of his or
her proportionate evaluation before proceeding.
6. Reporting and Training. In all cases, a prosecutor's office should
implement a system of reporting and supervisory review of
investigative steps taken in all cases. In addition, training of all
prosecutors on the ethics of investigative proportionality should be
available, required, and periodically repeated.
B. Explication of the Proposed Rule
"Proportionality" is a thread that runs throughout our conception
of the law and the philosophy of ethics. Whether express or implicit,
the concept plays a role in other areas of the law,145 for example,
international administrative law," Fourth Amendment assessment of
reasonableness, 47 and Eighth Amendment analysis of criminal
punishments." Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 seems plainly to
depend upon a proportionality evaluation, by lawyers as well as
judges, to regulate discovery-a form of fact investigation-in civil
cases.
149
More generally, in the ethics context Professor Mark Aaronson has
expressly identified a sense of proportionality-also called
145. As Professor Charles Black has argued, "the idea of proportionality is seen
several times in the first eight [constitutional] amendments: 'excessive bail,'
[']excessive fines,' 'unreasonable searches and seizures."' Charles L Black Jr., On
Reading and Using the Ninth Amendment, in The Humane Imagination 186, 196
(1986).
146. See Jeffrey Lowell & Anthony Lester, Proportionality: Neither Novel Nor
Dangerous, in New Directions in Judicial Review: Current Legal Problems 51 passim
(J.L. Lowell & D. Oliver eds., 1988).
147. See Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 St.
John's L. Rev. 1097, 1098 (1998) (arguing that "[r]easonable intrusions must be
proportionate to legitimate governmental purposes-more intrusive government
action requires more justification").
148. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part) ("Our decisions recognize that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
encompasses a narrow proportionality principle."); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37,43-44(1984) (noting that the Court has occasionally struck down punishments as inherently
disproportionate, although holding that individual case proportionality review is not
required in capital cases); Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital
Cases by State High Courts After Gregg: Only "the Appearance of Justice"?, 87 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 130 passim (1996).
149. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)(iii) (allowing the court to limit discovery upon a
determination that "the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into
account" various factors), 26(g)(3) (requiring attorneys to certify that their discovery
requests are "not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive" under the
factors set forth in Rule 26(b)(1)).
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moderation or temperance-as a central ethical precept, one of the
"four cardinal civic virtues" necessary for all lawyers to practice fully
as representatives of a public profession."0 Similarly, Professor Fred
Zacharias has identified "objectivity" as a "core" ethical theme: "the
ability to distance oneself... in order to evaluate the effect of
potential actions on clients, third parties, and the legal system.""'
By its very definition, proportionality is a fact-dependant,
contextual concept. Although it is not specific, I believe that most
lawyers have some intuitive sense of what it means. The uniform
principle underlying the concept is one of balance, of equitable
relationship between parts or interests which are, in some sense,
competing. Webster's Dictionary defines "proportion" as a
"harmonious relation of parts to each other or to the whole.., a
reasonable or desirable estimation or assignment of relative value."' 52
Authorities as diverse as Aristotle 53 and Max Weber""1 endorse the
concept of proportionality. In their detailed article tracing the
concept throughout European legal systems as well as British common
law, Professors Lowell and Lester note the following principle of
proportionality, adopted by a 41-member international group in 1980:
"[Member nations should] maintain a proper balance between any
adverse effects which its decision may have on the rights, liberties or
interests of persons and the purpose which it pursues.' 1 5  This
statement embodies precisely the sort of balancing in which this
Article envisions prosecutors engaging as a matter of investigative
ethics.
The idea that discretion need not always be exercised to its absolute
limit-found in the proposed rule's first sentence-is a common one.
Some might even argue that prosecutors already engage in the
suggested sort of proportionality evaluation in their criminal
150. See Mark Neal Aaronson, Be Just to One Another: Preliminary Thoughts on
Civilit; Moral Character, and Professionalism, 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 113, 117 & n.14
(1995). Professor Aaronson notes that "[b]oth courage [another of the cardinal
virtues] and moderation involve having a sense of proportion about when and how to
act." Id. at 147. Similarly, Phillip Selznick has noted that proportionality is a
recurrent theme in theories of the allocation of social justice. See Philip Selznick, The
Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of Community 431-32 (1992).
151. Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 1303, 1307 (1995).
152. Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 1819
(unabr. 1986). The concept is therefore linked directly to "reasonableness," a concept
applied in many legal tests.
153. See Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics Book III, chs. 10-12, at 102-08 (J.A.K.
Thomson trans., Penguin 1959) (4th cent. B.C.E.). In the American tradition, we
speak admiringly of the proverb, "moderation in all things." See A Dictionary of
Proverbs 414 (1992) (attributing the phrase to a half-dozen sources).
154. See Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in From Max Weber: Essays in
Sociology 77, 115 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills ed. & trans., 1958).
155. Lowell & Lester, supra note 146, at 52 (citing a resolution adopted by the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on March 11, 1980).
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investigations. My anecdotal experience, however, indicates that this
is not always so: routine investigative steps are often taken without
regard to their proportionality in light of the particular facts of the
matter at issue. Moreover, while prosecutors routinely consider the
costs of investigation to their own budgets, they often fail to consider,
or take seriously, the costs of the investigative steps to the targets or
third-party recipients. For example, how often in practice do
prosecutors issue subpoenas for documents to business enterprises
that are almost without bounds, such as a demand for "all documents
created by the XYZ component from 1994-99" (the entire statute of
limitations period), or "all emails sent or received by the following 15
persons?" We can hardly know the answer, because prosecutors,
having routinely issued such broad subpoenas, just as routinely
narrow them in response to calls from savvy defense counsel or
negative judicial indications at initial hearings. Consequently, few
decisions are reported.156  But such an "issue now, limit later"
approach demonstrates an absence of proportionality analysis ab
initio.
Similarly, prosecutors often authorize search warrants merely upon
approving probable cause and specificity of the search-objects,
without considering the extent of the intrusion or the impact on the
target or on other, innocent, occupants of the space to be searched.1 7
Unannounced "surprise" witness interviews are also often authorized
despite, or even because of, the in terrorem effect that they will have
on the targets of the investigation (which may be fair) or innocent
third parties such as family members (which seems less so). Similarly,
undercover investigations are established and wiretaps are sought
with evaluation primarily of the cost of such techniques to the
government-they are not inexpensive-but less, or no, consideration
of the toll such steps may exact from the targets and innocent third
parties.
It is more the evaluation of such investigative steps, rather than the
use of the techniques themselves, that this Article seeks to influence
by the language of the rule presented above. Such evaluation may or
may not reduce the actual use of various investigative techniques.
While this Article briefly speculates below as to how such a rule might
operate in practice, it is just speculation. Interested criminal litigators
and ethicists should engage in more detailed evaluation. The current
project is focused instead on suggesting some specific content for a
156. See infra notes 170, 176 and accompanying text.
157. This is not to say that all such searches are unethical; they obviously are not
and many would continue to be authorized even after the express proportionality
evaluation that the rule proposed here would require. The purpose of this proposal is
not to substantively alter the use of any investigative technique, except perhaps at the
margins. Hopefully, however, the rule would centrally alter the way in which
prosecutors evaluate their use of such techniques.
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new rule that might enable enforcement of the concept as a usable
ethical norm, and avoiding the creation of just one more "glittering
generality" with no force and little heed.
This Article suggests that, at the very least, prosecutors should be
directed by the ethical codes to consider the proportionality of their
discretionary investigative decisions. A prosecutor's decisions often
operate on multiple axes, so that a simple dual concept of
proportionality, involving merely the balance of one factor against
another, is too simplistic. A multifaceted, contextual evaluation is
required, in any case in which it might matter. Roughly speaking,
however, "proportionality" as an ethical precept for prosecutors
involves balancing the costs or adverse impacts of any particular
investigative step against the severity of the offense under
investigation and the likelihood that the proposed step will produce
useful information. 5 '
C. Evaluation of the Proposal: What Effects
Might It Have in Practice?
The first point to be made is that the proposed rule does not really
break new substantive ground. Instead, it merely formalizes as an
ethical rule the standards that many prosecutors might agree are
already applied in practice, and which already can be found in other
sources.
For example, the first sentence of the proposal (which might be
criticized as perhaps too obvious to require express statement) is
simply analogous to the existing Criminal Justice Prosecution
Function Standard 3-3.9 regarding "Discretion in the Charging
Decision:" "[t]he prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges
which the evidence might support. The prosecutor may in some
circumstances and for good cause consistent with the public interest
decline to prosecute ... "159
The second paragraph of the rule also tracks the existing "Charging
Decision" standard in some sense: "[i]llustrative of the factors which
the prosecutor may properly consider in exercising his or her
158. Some might suggest that the identity of the offender should also be taken into
account. Even if appropriate, however, this factor ultimately collapses into an
evaluation of the gravity of the offense itself. Thus, for example, perjury committed
by a testifying low-level drug dealer who is attempting to avoid an inevitable
conviction may be evaluated as a less serious offense than perjury committed by a
high-ranking executive official who has a public duty to enforce the law. Similarly,
tax evasion committed by a likely murderer such as Al Capone can be viewed as a
more serious offense than tax evasion committed by otherwise law-abiding citizens.
This is not to say that any of these offenders should not be investigated or prosecuted.
Proportionately speaking, however, Al Capone's case, or the President's, might
reasonably be evaluated to merit more investigative effort and attention. See also
supra note 39 (quoting Amar & Amar).
159. Standards, 3d ed., supra note 8, Standard 3-3.9(b).
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discretion are... (iii) the disproportion of the authorized punishment
in relation to the particular offense or the offender.""lw
The official Commentary to this already-approved Standard notes
that "in exercising discretion in this way, the prosecutor is not
neglecting his or her public duty or discriminating among offenders.
The public interest is best served and evenhanded justice best
dispensed... by a flexible and individualized application of its norms
through the exercise of a prosecutor's thoughtful discretion." 6 '
Notably, the Charging Decision Standard and its Commentary have
remained the same since the ABA Standards were first promulgated
almost 30 years ago in 1971.16 Since the form and substance of this
Standard have apparently satisfied interested lawyers for three
decades, one may ask what reason there is to not extend it to the
investigative stage.11
Similarly, Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
already provides that a court may quash or modify a subpoena "if
compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive."" The Supreme
Court has endorsed this standard, and directed that it be applied
contextually in grand jury investigations.'6 Federal judges have found
the standard of Rule 17(c) manageable enough to quash certain
governmental subpoenas."6  In fact, courts plainly perform what
appears to be a proportionate evaluation in such cases, comparing
compliance costs to the gravity of the investigation. 67 One court has
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. Id cmt.
162. Compare id Standard 3-3.9, with 1971 Standards, supra note 55, Standard 3.9
(maintaining the same language). The function of the Commentary to the Standards
is not spelled out, but such commentary is common in the promulgation of ethical
codes. The purpose of such commentary is to provide helpful citations to relevant
judicial or other authorities, and at times to elucidate the rationale underlying the
formal standard. Such commentary is routinely said to neither expand upon nor
control the meaning of the standard to which it speaks. See, e.g., Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Scope, in ABA Compendium, supra note 118, at 16. Whether
this is really so in application may be doubted, but the intent of the drafters to explain
rather than to interpret seems clear.
163. Of course, an alternative argument might be that the Prosecution Function
Standards are not actually enforced, so the thirty-year existence of this Standard
proves nothing. Courts, however, do use the Standards from time to time. See supra
notes 93, 96 and accompanying text. Ineffective use of ethical standards is a separate
problem that can be addressed after they express the substantive norms we desire.
164. Fed. R Crim. P. 17(c); accord, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346
(1974) ("A grand jury's subpoena ... will be disallowed if it is 'far too sweeping in its
terms to be regarded as reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment." (quoting Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43,76 (1906))).
165. See United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 299 (1991) (observing
that "what is reasonable" depends "on context").
166. See, e.g., In re Subpoena to Testify Before Grand Jury, 630 F. Supp. 235, 237
(N.D. Ind. 1986) (quashing a subpoena under Rule 17(c)); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 626 F. Supp. 1057,1061 (D.P.R 1986) (same).
167. See, e.g., In re August, 1993 Regular Grand Jury, 854 F. Supp. 1392,1401 (S.D.
Ind. 1993) (finding a broad grand jury subpoena "not unreasonable in fight of the
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even stated a "least-intrusive-means" test for certain grand jury
subpoenas.""
As noted, federal civil practitioners are also required to certify the
proportionality of their fact-investigation discovery requests, under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.169 There is no reason to believe
that government prosecutors cannot apply a similar standard as an
internal ethical matter. Indeed, reported cases reflect the common
practice of prosecutors agreeing, in their investigative discretion, to
limit the scope of already-issued grand jury subpoenas upon objection
from recipients regarding oppressive compliance.170  These cases
indicate that prosecutors can recognize investigative disproportion
when it is called to their attention by opposing lawyers or judges. It
does not seem overburdensome to ask prosecutors to exercise such
discretion in advance rather than in hindsight.17' Indeed, such
prospective fairness analysis might be said to be the goal of many legal
ethics rules.
What would the proposed ethical standard mean in practice? First,
and perhaps most important, the general ethical standard could lead
prosecutors' offices to draft and implement internal ethical guidelines
for specific investigative measures and contexts. 2  Professor Fred
Zacharias has advocated development of the general "do justice"
maxim for prosecutors for this very reason. 3 Professor Gerard Lynch
has similarly advocated for more articulated standards in prosecutors'
offices. 4 If adoption of a general ethical rule stimulates prosecutors
to think more consciously and self-critically about their own actions,
and to make explicit for all the ethical proportionality precepts that
many of them already share, that effect alone would be beneficial.7 5
Second, by directing prosecutors to consider the extra-
governmental costs of their investigative decisions, the rule would be
consciousness-raising. It would compel prosecutors to be explicit and
subjects of investigation-wire and mail fraud, money laundering, and medicare and
medicaid fraud").
168. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Subpoena Duces Tecum, 829 F.2d 1291, 1302
(4th Cir. 1987).
169. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
170. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 920 F.2d 235, 244 n.10 (4th Cir. 1990); In re
August 1993 Regular Grand Jury, 854 F. Supp. 1392, 1401 (S.D. Ind. 1993); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings Witness Bardier, 486 F. Supp. 1203, 1214 (D. Nev. 1980).
171. Of course, in some cases a prosecutor will not know of, or be able to
appreciate, the burdens that a particular subpoena will create until it is issued and a
party explains particular compliance difficulties. The proposed ethical rule would
neither prevent such situations nor open them up to hindsight attack.
172. Almost 30 years ago, Professor Norman Abrahms discussed the development
and value of internal prosecutorial policies. See Norman Abrahms, Internal Policy:
Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discrection, 19 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1971).
173. See Zacharias, Do Justice, supra note 12, at 50, 109.
174. See Lynch, supra note 55, at 2143,2147.
175. See Zacharias, Specificity, supra note 142, at 231, 237.
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think more broadly in their assumptions, goals, and cost assessments.
Public prosecutors should, after all, be considering the costs of their
actions to all members of the public they serve. Moreover, it could
lead prosecutors to compel investigating agents also to consciously
consider and discuss such costs. Finally, regarding non-routine
matters or investigative steps, the rule would require group decision-
making through supervisory review, before the investigative step is
initiated. If two heads really are better than one, such group
evaluation with experienced personnel should prevent the odd,
disproportionate investigative step from occurring.
The realist, however, asks what investigative steps that prosecutors
currently employ would actually be blocked by this rule? Any at all?
It is, of course, impossible to know. But, having ventured out onto the
limb of specificity in language, let us proceed all the way to the
teetering end. Perhaps the new rule would eliminate indiscriminate
use of the phrase "including, but not limited to" from grand jury
subpoenas. That phrase is frowned upon by courts, 6 with good
reason: it often serves as a lazy substitute for precision in
description.'" It is disproportionate for prosecutors to demand that
witnesses bear the costs of producing "all documents" (which is what
the phrase may effectively require), when the actual targets of their
investigations are known and describable subsets of that universe.
Similarly, perhaps the rule would provide an additional check on
bad deals that prosecutors sometimes make with criminals: providing
immunity, leniency, or large reward sums to crooks for their assistance
in an investigation. Courts have recently expressed their concern
about immunity decisions that seem to cost more than they are
worth. Of course, not all or even most such cooperation deals are
disproportionate to the goals of the criminal investigation. But some
are. 79 Prosecutors should consciously confront all predictable costs of
176. See, eg., In re Subpoena to Testify Before Grand Jury, 630 F. Supp. 235,237-
38 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (granting motion to quash by eliminating the "including but not
limited to" phrase).
177. This is not always the case, however. Compare the following descriptions of
documents from hypothetical subpoenas for documents: "all corporate documents,
including but not limited to the following precise descriptions" versus "all documents
relating to target Bill Smith, including but not limited to...." Because the latter
language first focuses on a specific target, its subsequent description is not necessarily
overbroad, unreasonable, or disproportionate. Again, contextual evaluations are
required.
178. See United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1358 (10th Cir. 1998), rev'd en
banc, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2371 (1999); Sklansky, supra
note 12, at 516 (noting the underlying concerns of policy in Singleton). This is not a
new concern. See, e.g., Ramirez v. United States, 363 F.2d 33, 33-35 (9th Cir. 1966)
(vacating conviction of aider and abetter who received a five-year sentence, by a
debatable application of legal aiding and abetting principles, where the facts revealed
that the lead drug buyer had received probation in return for testimony).
179. For example, in its case against California defense attorney Patrick Hallinan,
the federal prosecutor granted immunity and rewards totaling $4,600,000 to a major
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immunity deals-to victims of the intended cooperator, to their own
long-term credibility and reputation, and to the criminal justice system
as a whole-before consummating such deals. If the target of the
investigation seems plainly less culpable than the cooperator, or if the
government does not know their respective levels of culpability, or if
the target's offenses are less serious than the cooperator's, the deal
may well be disproportionate. The rule should at least force these
considerations into the open for discussion, and block the grossly
disproportionate bargain.
In the search warrant context, perhaps the rule would constrain
some searches of non-targets' residences. The case law burgeons with
instances of highly intrusive searches of innocent parties' homes
pursuant to warrants, without finding the target individual, at some
cost to the government (in terms of money as well as public
credibility) and to the innocent parties involved.' Such potential
costs should be considered by prosecutors in advance, and sometimes
additional traditional investigative work should be ordered-for
example, more personal surveillance-before such intrusive
investigative steps are taken.
Interested ethicists can doubtless come up with more concrete
examples in which an express proportionality test might alter the
result. At the very least such a test could stimulate prosecutors in
their own thinking and development of internal norms.18' These
possible benefits counsel at least thoughtful consideration of a
proportionality rule.
D. Objections and Limitations
Despite this Article's apparent enthusiasm, some objections and
limitations regarding the proposed ethical rule are immediately
apparent. Others are sure to be identified by thoughtful critics; that
effort should be encouraged and supported. The goal is to determine
whether specific ethical rules are necessary for the investigative stage
and, if so, to make them as effective as possible without overwhelming
already-stressed good faith prosecutors or chilling important
investigations of criminal violators.
Immediate objections to the proposed rule tend to come from both
marijuana importer for cooperation against the attorney, who had no prior criminal
record and was never suspected of direct criminal involvement in narcotics
importation or distribution. See generally Howard Mintz, Fort Reno's Obsession, Am.
Law., May 1995, at 54 (describing the Hallinan case). Hallinan was acquitted on all
counts after a lengthy and expensive trial. See id.
180. See Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692, 1695-96 (1999). Although the officers in
Wilson were ultimately granted immunity, defending a suit all the way to the Supreme
Court is expensive, and such future searches will not receive immunity.
181. See Zacharias, Do Justice, supra note 12, at 50; see id. at 109 ("[C]hange in
orientation by supervisors and other staff members, in turn, could create pressure
toward voluntary improvements in conduct.").
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ends of the criminal practice perspective. The prosecution-minded
are horrified at the thought of important criminal investigations being
chilled by threat of bar disciplinary charges and § 1983 suits'1 being
filed against prosecutors who approve any effective investigative step.
Meanwhile, some prosecutors also contend that the rule would not
really alter current investigative practices; the concrete examples
offered are already recognized as bad prosecutorial decisions
(strategically if not also ethically) and they can be prevented without
shackling prosecutors with new rules that will inevitably be used as
clubs.
Meanwhile, the defense-minded are not optimistic that the
proposed rule will do any good at all. Authorities rarely discipline
prosecutors, and civil suits are generally fruitless given the generous
qualified immunity standard as well as normal jury sympathies.1 3
Furthermore, these critics might contend that prosecutors never
internalize ethical norms to the disadvantage of effective law
enforcement, absent some more compelling external force such as a
statute, constitutional provision, or well-publicized and successful
lawsuit.
There is substantial merit to each of these positions. Moreover,
they share a disturbing common thread: that the rule will not actually
improve the ethics of a prosecutor's office. If that is true, from either
perspective, then the rule is simply not worth the negative side-effects
that might result. Aspirational ethical rules that do not actually
improve conduct, and yet cause deleterious consequences, are the sort
of glittering generalities we can do without.
Yet if one shares the belief that most prosecutors actually do want
to act fairly, seek justice, and obey the ethical rules as closely as
possible," this somewhat discounts the defense objection that the
182. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Section 1983 expressly countenances only those
lawsuits that allege deprivation of rights that the United States Constitution and laws
guarantee. The spectre of civil suits based solely upon violations of ethical rules
therefore might initially be viewed as a red herring. In 1998, however, Congress
directed by statute that federal prosecutors abide by state ethical rules. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 530B. The impact that this statutory incorporation-by-reference of ethics rules will
have on § 1983 litigation remains to be seen.
183. For qualified immunity not to apply, a prosecutor's conduct must violate
clearly established norms. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Indeed,
the protective umbrella of qualified immunity "provides ample protection to all but
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Burns v. Reed, 500
U.S. 478, 495 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). Moreover,
even if qualified immunity fails to get prosecutors out of a suit at the summary
judgment stage, a jury must be persuaded to rule against them. If the defendant has
been convicted of, or even just involved in, criminal activity, this is quite unlikely
absent a gross prosecutorial act. Even where innocent third parties are plaintiffs,
juries may on the whole be disinclined to rule against law enforcement officers.
184. See Little, Federal Death Penalty, supra note 106, at 460 n.524, 467 n.550
(arguing that internal policies "deeply influence" prosecutorial behavior); see also
Stephen D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. Cal.
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proposed rule would make no difference, though the absence of
effective prosecutorial discipline is distressing.1 85  Moreover, if
nonenforcement of prosecutorial ethical norms is an objection, the
answer is greater enforcement, not an absence of norms.
On the other hand, I take quite seriously the threat of chilling
affirmative use of the proposed rule as a litigation "club" against
prosecutors. In general, such affirmative use of ethical rules to gain
strategic advantages in litigation is a practice to be condemned. The
Model Rules counsel against such a practice.'86 They also strongly
caution that even the imposition of state bar disciplinary sanctions
should not be considered in "20/20 hindsight," and should recognize
"that a lawyer often has to act upon uncertain or incomplete
evidence."'" Surely this applies most commonly in the prosecutorial
context.
In order to guard against the long-term chilling effect that
unconsidered discipline or litigation can have on the development of
progressive ethical policies for prosecutors, courts and disciplinary
authorities must take their responsibilities in this area very seriously,
and not allow the use of ethical rules as clubs against prosecutors
unless clearly warranted.' Moreover, to forestall chilling, affirmative
uses of the proposed rule, it has been drafted to make only the
prosecutorial approval of "grossly disproportionate" investigative
steps subject to discipline. 189 Furthermore, the proposal employs
"should" rather than "shall" to describe the prosecutor's ethical duties
in the investigative stage. Hopefully, this language, while clarifying
the rule's aspirational goals and providing structure for the
development of internal policies, would minimize the use of the rule
as a strategic litigation device. The deliberate choice of largely
"nonenforceable" phraseology reflects a desire to put Professor
Simon's vision of "institutionalizing" the contextual view of legal
ethics to the test.1 90
L. Rev. 643,708-17 (1997) (same).
185. Civil suits against prosecutors do, though infrequently, sometimes go forward.
Just this past Term, the Supreme Court remanded such a case for trial, in which a
prosecutor ordered a defense attorney physically searched while the attorney was in
the courthouse representing a client before the grand jury. See Conn v. Gabbert, 119
S. Ct. 1292, 1293 (1999).
186. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Scope, para. 18 ("Violation of a
Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it create any presumption
that a legal duty has been breached. The Rules... are not designed to be a basis for
civil liability.")
187. Id. para. 17.
188. See Little, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 73, at 426-27.
189. See Proposed Criminal Justice Standard, infra app. para. 4. (reprinting the
proposed rule).
190. See Simon, supra note 17, at 196 ("An enforcement structure inspired by the
Contextual View would have two main features: a disciplinary regime consisting
largely of contextual norms, and a set of rules designed to encourage voluntary ethical
commitments....").
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In the end, any ethical regime will only be as effective as its
institutional implementors allow it to be. The drafters of ethical rules
must assume the general good faith and common sense of all
participants. They must also endorse swift sanctions for those who
misuse or misapply the rules, no less than for those who do not follow
them. Prosecutors' offices generally enjoy strong community support
and lobbying leverage; if the proposed rule were enacted and then
used to chill effective and fair law enforcement, it would not long
survive.
IV. INVESTIGATIVE SUPERVISION, REPORTING,
AND ETHICS TRAINING
The tail end of an article is not the place to fully develop the
contours of a new ethical duty to seek supervision. Such a duty,
however, not currently recognized in any ethical code, is a basic
premise of this Article. Prosecutors, if not all lawyers, should be
required to seek supervision before making significant investigative
decisions. The proposal also makes explicit a duty for prosecutors'
offices to provide training on the exercise of investigative discretion.
These concepts are briefly outlined below, with anticipation of further
development and critique from interested ethicists.
A. The Duty to Seek Supervision and to Report
Investigative Decisions
Current ethics rules implicitly recognize the importance of
supervision for lawyers. For example, ABA Model Rule 5.1 describes
the ethical duties of "supervisory lawyers."'' 1 Rule 5.2 also recognizes
that some lawyers will function in the role of supervisees, although it
says nothing about an ethical responsibility to seek supervision.'9 The
ABA's Ethics Committee has recognized that it is often valuable for
lawyers to seek the advice of other, more experienced attorneys.1 93
This Article contends, however, that these existing ethical
authorities do not go far enough. None of the existing authorities
posit that there is sometimes an ethical duty to seek out advice and
supervisory review. Yet significant investigative decisions made by a
191. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.1(b) (1998) ("A lawyer
having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts
to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct."); see
generally Irwin D. Miller, Preventing Misconduct by Promoting the Ethics of
Attorneys' Supervisory Duties, 70 Notre Dame L. Rev. 259 (1994) (discussing the
importance of enforcing Model Rule 5.1). Professor Miller notes that even prior to
the 1983 Model Rules, an ethical duty of reasonable supervision could be found in
some case decisions. Id. at 275-76.
192- See Model Rules of Professional Responsibility Rule 5.2.
193. See ABA Formal Op. 98-411 at 2 & n.2 (Aug. 30, 1998).
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prosecutor often have too large an impact to appropriately be the
province of any single lawyer. The rule proposed here would require
(1) that prosecutors report all investigative decisions to a supervisor
for at least hindsight review, and (2) that non-routine investigative
steps, or steps taken in non-routine investigations, be submitted for
supervisory review and group discussion before they are implemented,
unless valid time pressures ("exigent circumstances," in the vernacular
of the criminal law) excuse it.194
The goal of any ethics-rule structure for attorneys is to ensure, so
far as practicable, fairness in the practice of law.'95 When it comes to
significant exercises of prosecutorial discretion, the consideration of a
single lawyer may sometimes be insufficient to assure the fair exercise
of discretion. This may be due to many variables, including overall
inexperience, unfamiliarity with the particular decision at issue, lack
of knowledge regarding new developments in the law, or a particular
insensitivity to certain public interests. Where investigative decisions
are at issue, this latter condition of myopic insensitivity can occur for,
in turn, myriad reasons: inexperience, over-commitment to a
particular investigation or pursuit of a particular target, lack of
training or knowledge regarding a particular investigative technique,
lack of regular contact with representatives of other, non-
prosecutorial views, or simple insensitivity in a particular situation.
This Article asserts that when it comes to significant exercises of
prosecutorial investigative discretion, group consideration will more
consistently lead to fair, proportionate decisions. This will not always
be true, of course, particularly if an entire prosecutorial office has
become isolated from the community which it serves or insulated from
competing views. Even in an insulated prosecutorial office, however,
experienced attorneys can check excesses born simply of inexperience
or lack of training or knowledge. Similarly, if a particular prosecutor
(even an experienced one) has developed a myopic enthusiasm
regarding any particular matter, supervisory review can provide
healthy cautions or, at least, a broader consideration of competing
concerns.
Ethics rules, however, have historically been based upon the image
of sole practitioners, or solo operators functioning autonomously even
within a firm or practice group. 96 Even the Model Rules, which were
194. Cf Levenson, supra note 12, at 569 ("[T]here must be a constant review of the
decisions young prosecutors make."). This Article would extend this advice to all
prosecutors, not just the young or inexperienced.
195. Some might dispute this or at least posit other, sometimes competing, goals.
However, goals such as client satisfaction, loyalty, truth-seeking, or zealous advocacy,
can be made to fit an overall fairness model. See, e.g., Monroe Freedman, Lawyers'
Ethics in an Adversary System 9-24 (1975).
196. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering:
A Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct § 5:101, at 765 (2d ed.
1990) ("[A] 'single lawyer, simple client' assumption ... animated the (1969] Code, an
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promulgated in 1983 to self-consciously address the 1969 Code's lack
of focus on the group practice context,' 97 do not expressly advert to the
group practice context of prosecutors' offices. 19
Yet while perhaps recognizing an exception for small, rural
communities, the image of the solo "cowboy" prosecutor is badly (and
unhealthily) out-of-date regarding modem prosecutors' offices.? 9
Without performing an exhaustive empirical survey, let us assume that
most prosecutors today practice within offices larger than ten
lawyers.10 When the prosecutor's office is of this size or larger, an
ethical rule requiring proportionate investigative steps should also
mandate that attorneys making significant investigative decisions have
a duty to seek out, prospectively, advice and supervisory review.
It must be emphasized that the duty of prospective supervision
would not apply to all investigative steps. It is difficult to imagine how
it could, realistically, given the time and resource constraints under
which most prosecutors' offices operate and the routine (and
therefore, ex hypothesis, proportionate) nature of many of their
investigative decisions. Even if prospective review of all investigative
decisions might be helpful on the margin, the criminal justice system
generally cannot afford the luxury of such review in all cases. Thus
the proposed rule would not mandate prospective supervisory review
for routine investigative decisions-although, of course, it would not
prohibit seeking such advice either. While many routine investigative
steps require no group analysis to be determined proportionate, the
best ethical advice is always to consider seeking supervisory review
whenever a prosecutorial decision seems the least bit sensitive to the
individual "line" prosecutor.
Moreover, the proposed rule would require that prosecutors report
all their investigative decisions at some timely point after the fact, so
that experienced supervisory review can be brought to bear on all
prosecutorial investigations at some relevant juncture. In such
hindsight review, supervisory prosecuting attorneys should look
carefully for investigative decisions that seem out of proportion to the
matter, and bring them back to the investigating prosecutor (and
assumption... no longer comporting with modem realities.").
197. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Preamble (1998).
19& See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 (1998) (discussing the
special ethical responsibilities of "a" prosecutor).
199. See Abrahms, supra note 172, at 1 (noting, in 1971, that "[tihe modem
prosecutor... [is] no longer the individual district attorney," but rather practices in "a
large bureaucratic institution comprised of tens or sometimes hundreds of lawyers").
200. Even if this were proved to be not empirically so, the rule proposed in this
Article could be limited to prosecutorial offices of ten or more attorneys. Small
prosecutors' offices generally have one prosecutor who is the elected district attorney
and thereby bears supervisory responsibility for the other lawyers in his or her office.
Even in offices of fewer than ten lawyers, group consideration of significant
investigative steps may occur naturally, and may not need the stimulus of an ethical
rule.
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perhaps other experienced prosecutors) for discussion and, possibly,
reconsideration.
Meanwhile, for all non-routine investigative steps, the proposed
rule would make explicit an ethical duty to seek advance supervisory
review. The only exception to this requirement would be when
exigent circumstances require immediate investigative action. Such
situations are not uncommon: it may be imperative to conduct a
search quickly in response to an unanticipated development; a witness
may "flip" on the eve of a vital meeting which must be recorded; or a
new telephone number may suddenly become relevant at a crucial
juncture of a wiretap investigation. When a prosecutor makes
exigent, non-routine investigative decisions alone, however, he or she
should report them for supervisory review as soon as circumstances
permit, perhaps even contemporaneously with implementation of the
investigative step.
Further, exigencies should be real, not manufactured. Most
experienced prosecutors are familiar with the "emergency" request
for a search warrant or other investigative tool from law enforcement
agents who, upon cool inquiry, concede that there is actually no strong
reason to rush. Six or twelve hours' delay often will not prejudice an
investigation, and may yield great benefits in terms of group
consideration. Of course, prosecutors must make such judgments
under great pressures, and their decisions in this regard should not be
nit-picked in hindsight review. Nothing is more destructive to the
morale and effectiveness of aggressive, but good-faith, prosecution
than hindsight attacks made without appreciation of real-world
criminal justice pressures. This exception to the proposed
requirement of prospective supervision should therefore, when
properly applied, never permit later ethical charges based on a claim
of non-exigency.
In most cases, however, where a non-routine investigative
technique (for example, a wiretap) is suggested, or in a high-profile
investigation where all involved know that their decisions will later be
microscopically examined, a duty to seek prospective review is
appropriate. The impact of non-routine investigative steps (or most
steps in a non-routine matter) is too large to entrust it to the single
mind of even the good-faith experienced prosecutor. Similarly,
individual prosecutors can lose their perspectives, and the non-routine
instance demands supervisory review to block non-routine harms.
The credibility of the prosecutorial profession has been harmed in the
past by investigative excesses that appear to have been the result of
unsupervised solo prosecutors.201 While no ethical rule will prevent
201. See United States v. Boyd, 833 F. Supp. 1277 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (reversing the
conviction of El Rukin gang members based on "gross prosecutorial misconduct"),
aff'd, 55 F.3d 239, 246 (7th Cir. 1995); supra note 179 (discussing the Hallinan
prosecution, acquittal, and attendant bad press).
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every such occurrence, one that mandates supervisory review and
group consideration in non-routine situations should improve the
overall percentage.
Of what would the required supervisory review consist in practice?
This Article does not suggest an overly formal process. Absent
disagreement among the prosecutors, simple oral consultation would
often suffice. Again, the development of internal standards for the
details would be part of an evolutionary process. In fact, most
sophisticated prosecutors' offices of any size today already have a
practice of seeking supervision in place.0 - Line attorneys must report
non-routine investigative events and decisions, and even experienced
attorneys are expected to seek supervisory review of unusual
investigative steps. Incorporating this concept into an ethical rule
would, in some sense, merely formalize what large prosecutors' offices
have already recognized: supervision improves overall fairness, as well
as effective law enforcement.
B. The Duty to Provide Ethics Training
Prosecution Function Standard 3-2.6 already directs prosecutors'
offices to maintain effective training programs for their lawyersye
The 1967 Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice stressed a point which is still, if not more,
valid today: while a prosecutor's background may provide sufficient
training for the trial and courtroom aspects of the job, "it does not
necessarily prepare the man [or woman] for ... law enforcement
functions."0 This existing Standard, however, has generally been
interpreted within prosecutors' offices as requiring training only in
substantive areas of law. The rule proposed in this Article would
make clear that the duty to provide training should encompass ethics
training. With specific regard to the investigative context, prosecutors
should receive training on their office's view regarding the
proportionate exercise of investigative discretion.2 0
Although Prosecution Function Standard 3-2.6 has existed since
1971, prosecutors' offices have only recently, if at all, begun to
mandate ethics training.P Indeed, until 1988, when the Second
202- See Melilli, supra note 5, at 687.
203. See Standards, 3d ed., supra note 8, Standard 3-2.6 ("Training programs
should be established within the prosecutor's office for new personnel and for
continuing education .... ).
204. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 148 (1967).
205. Accord, Levenson, supra note 12, at 569 (exhorting prosecutors' offices to
"Train the People Right").
206. For example, the U.S. Department of Justice's "Professional Responsibility
Officer" ethics training program was instituted only in 1994. See Little, Federal Death
Penalty, supra note 106, at 467 n.550.
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Circuit shocked the prosecutorial universe by dismissing an
indictment for violation of an ethical rule,207 most prosecutors
practiced without giving much active attention to the specifics of their
local ethics codes.
In 1994, however, the U.S. Department of Justice instituted the
Professional Responsibility Officer ("PRO") training program. The
PRO program has produced a thick Ethics Manual, and it directs each
U.S. Attorney's office and each Main Justice component to designate
at least one experienced attorney as the Professional Responsibility
Officer ("PRO") for their offices. All PROs are required to attend a
national ethics training seminar when offered (about every 18
months), and is then expected to return to his or her office and
provide ethics training to officemates. Attorney General Janet Reno
and then-Assistant Attorney General JoAnn Harris deserve great
credit for instituting the Department's first-ever stand-alone ethics
training program. 8
The most effective manifestation of a prosecutorial ethics training
program provides training not just on applicable substantive
standards, but also on the fair exercise of discretion. This recognizes
the many prosecutorial areas in which existing standards merely set an
ethical floor for conduct. The best ethics training program assists
prosecutors in developing their own thinking about ethical issues
beyond the rules, and encourages them to develop internal standards
for the fair exercise of their discretion within the law.
Thus if a new rule calls for the proportionate exercise of
investigative discretion, a prosecutor's office ought to provide training
for its attorneys on what this might mean in concrete situations. This
training might necessarily be office-specific, to reflect the local
community's sense of fairness; investigative steps viewed as routine
and obviously proportionate in the Southern District of New York
might shock a more rural or less crime-ridden community. Again, the
investigative proportionality advocated by the proposed rule is
contextual, and the relevant context might well include consideration
of community fairness values that differ in various places across the
country.
Each prosecutor's office should therefore develop its own training
program to address ethics in the investigative stage. Such a program
207. See United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839-40 (2d Cir. 1988).
208. Moreover, in 1999 the Department created a unit titled the Professional
Responsibility Advisory Office ("PRAO"), whose mission is to provide ethics advice
to the 9000 or so federal prosecutors around the country. The PRAO was created in
part to address significant questions arising out of the 1999 McDade Act, which for
the first time clarifies that local rules of ethics apply to federal attorneys wherever
they may practice. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (Supp. 1999); Reining in the Prosecutors,
Wash. Post, Apr. 23, 1999, at A36. The dedication of a full-time ethics advice function
within the Department is a further positive development toward the fair exercise of
prosecutorial discretion at the federal level.
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ought to survey existing investigative techniques that the office uses
with some regularity, and develop a sense of what factors are relevant
in deciding to use, or to reject the use of, such techniques. Real cases
from that office ought to be used as training vehicles when possible.
Furthermore, the training program should require periodic retraining
of all attorneys, rather than being reserved only for the inexperienced.
Indeed, it is sometimes the experienced prosecutor, who has become
jaded to the effects that his or her investigative decisions can have on
the outside world, that presents the largest challenge for effective
prosecutorial ethics training.
Certainly much more could and ought to be said regarding the
development of prosecutorial ethics training programs. As Standard
3-2.6 already provides,2 9 such programs are an ethical responsibility
for every aspect of a prosecutor's job, not just at the investigative
stage. The duty to provide such training is included specifically within
this proposal not to restrict it to the investigative stage, but simply to
emphasize that it is an integral component of any rules structure
addressing prosecutorial discretion.
CONCLUSION
When the ABA first adapted its Prosecution Function Standards in
1971, it warned that "the proposed standards will often recognize that
ambiguity is intrinsic in many of the problems with which they deal
and the advocate's conscience must guide. '210 The ABA declared,
however, that "[t]his should be taken not as an attempt to evade the
responsibility of statement but rather as candid recognition of the
limits of wholesome definition."' This Article recognizes that the
investigative stages of a criminal case have historically been viewed as
almost entirely open to unregulated prosecutorial discretion. Yet
decisions made in the pre-charging investigative stage can have
significant impacts on the innocent as well as the guilty. This Article
proposes that the time has come to examine whether contextual ethics
rules can usefully serve to improve fairness in the exercise of the
prosecutor's investigative role. The concrete language proposed will
hopefully draw constructive debate as well as fire.
209. See supra note 203.
210. 1971 Standards, supra note 55, General Introduction, at 6.
211. Id
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APPENDIX
Proportionality in Investigation
1. A prosecutor is not obligated to take every possible step in the
investigation of a suspected criminal offense. Rather, the prosecutor
should consciously engage in an analysis of proportionality in
choosing which investigative steps to pursue, and how aggressively
to pursue them.212
2. At a minimum, a proportionate investigative decision should
consider:
(a) the monetary cost of the step, not just for the prosecutor's
office, but also for any witnesses who must comply with
investigative demands;
(b) nonmonetary costs of the step, such as intrusions on privacy,
potential harm to innocent third parties, potential for violence or
destructive harm, damage to the prosecution office's own
credibility or community standing, and any unnecessary
interference with witness's ongoing lives;
(c) the potential benefits of the step, and whether those benefits
could be achieved by less intrusive or costly means.
3. These costs and considerations should be balanced against the
gravity of the offense and any exigent time constraints.
4. A prosecutor should not approve a particular investigative step or
strategy that reasonably seems grossly disproportionate after
evaluation, including supervisory evaluation as required below.
5. Duty to Seek Supervision. In any non-routine or high-profile
matter, or for non-routine investigative techniques, the investigating
prosecutor should seek supervisory review and approval of his or
her proportionate evaluation before proceeding.
6. Reporting and Training. In all cases, a prosecutor's office should
implement a system of reporting and supervisory review of
investigative steps taken in all cases. In addition, training of all
prosecutors on the ethics of investigative proportionality should be
available, required, and periodically repeated.
212. It should go without saying that all investigative techniques should be invoked
initially only in good faith and to further a bona fide criminal investigation. It is the
general rule, for example, that a grand jury subpoena may not be issued "for the sole
purpose of harassment [or] intimidation." In Re Grand Jury Subpoena: Subpoena
Duces Tecum, 829 F.2d 1291, 1305 (4th Cir. 1987) (Wilkenson, j., concurring).
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